How Al-Qaeda Survived for 16 Years After Staging the 9/11 Attacks

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Sixteen years ago, on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda conducted the most destructive terrorist attack in history.

An unprecedented onslaught from the U.S. followed. One-third of Al-Qaeda’s leadership was killed or captured in the following year. The group lost its safe haven in Afghanistan, including its extensive training infrastructure there. Its surviving members were on the run or in hiding. Though it took nearly 10 years, the U.S. succeeded in killing Al-Qaeda’s founding leader, Osama bin Laden. Since 2014, Al-Qaeda has been overshadowed by its former ally Al-Qaeda in Iraq, now calling itself the Islamic State.

In other words, Al-Qaeda should not have survived the 16 years since 9/11.

So why has it?

The Ties That Bind

Much of the credit goes to Al-Qaeda’s extraordinary ability to both form alliances and sustain them over time and under pressure.

In my forthcoming book “Alliances for Terror,” I examine why a small number of groups, such as Al-Qaeda and IS, emerge as desirable partners and succeed at developing alliance networks.

Understanding terrorist alliances is critical because terrorist organizations with allies are more lethal, survive longer and are more apt to seek weapons of mass destruction. Though terrorist partnerships face numerous hurdles and severing Al-Qaeda’s alliances has been a U.S. objective for more than a decade, the fact is that these counterterrorism efforts have failed.

It was allies that enabled Al-Qaeda to survive the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The Afghan Taliban stood by Al-Qaeda after the attack, refusing to surrender bin Laden and thereby precipitating the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Fleeing, Al-Qaeda was able to turn to allies in Pakistan to hide its operatives and punish the Pakistani government for capitulating to U.S. pressure to crackdown on the group.

It was alliances that helped Al-Qaeda continue to terrorize. In October 2002, for example, Al-Qaeda’s ally in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah, struck a bar and a nightclub in Bali, killing more than 200 and injuring more than 200 more, to brutally commemorate the first anniversary of 9/11.

And it was alliances that allowed Al-Qaeda to project viability. With the “prestige” that came with conducting 9/11, Al-Qaeda was able to forge more of them and indeed create affiliate alliances in which partners adopted its name and pledged allegiance to bin Laden.

Al-Qaeda’s first and most notorious affiliate alliance, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was formed in 2004 with Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Using the standing he accrued through his role in the insurgency in Iraq, Zarqawi then helped Al-Qaeda acquire its second affiliate in 2006, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Then, in 2009, Al-Qaeda designated its branch in Yemen and Saudi Arabia as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Its alliances spanned the Middle East and helped it to project power, despite the U.S. war on terrorism.

A Lower Profile

While Al-Qaeda still sought affiliates, by 2010, it modified how its alliances work.

Al-Qaeda forged an alliance with al-Shabaab in Somalia, but did not publicly announce it or ask al-Shabaab to change its name. Bin Laden justified to al-Shabaab’s leader the shift to a less visible form of alliance as a way to prevent an increase in counterterrorism pressure or a loss of funds from the Arabian Peninsula. He privately expressed concerns that Al-Qaeda’s name “reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them, and allows the enemies to claim deceptively that they are not at war with Islam.” Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, saw the move as bin Laden capitulating to members of Al-Qaeda who worried about “inflating the size and the growth of Al-Qaeda.” After bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri publicly announced Al-Qaeda’s alliance with al-Shabaab, though al-Shabaab still did not adopt Al-Qaeda’s name.

Though Al-Qaeda’s alliance arrangements have varied, these relationships have helped it to survive the loss of its founding leader in 2011 and the ascent of a far less capable leader. Zawahiri’s rise to the helm of the group was the consequence of an alliance, specifically between his original Egyptian group, al-Jihad, and Al-Qaeda. The alliance culminated in a merger in 2001, with Zawahiri becoming bin Laden’s deputy and successor.

However, Zawahiri lacks bin Laden’s cachet or diplomatic savvy. He is a better deputy than a leader. His poor handling of the strife between jihadist group al-Nusra in Syria and its parent organization, the Islamic State in Iraq (previously Al-Qaeda in Iraq and now IS), led to the alliance rupture between Al-Qaeda and its affiliate in Iraq.

Though al-Qaeda had an acrimonious break with IS, it gained al-Nusra as an affiliate in the central conflict in the Sunni jihadist movement: Syria. As was the case with al-Shabaab, this alliance with al-Nusra did not include a rebranding and was initially kept secret. In addition, al-Nusra subsequently changed its name, an effort to gain more legitimacy within the conflict in Syria by publicly distancing itself from Al-Qaeda, though seemingly with Al-Qaeda’s consent.

Al-Qaeda has not acquired another affiliate since the alliance rupture and rise of IS as a rival in 2014. It organized existing members into a new branch, Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent, that year. The branch in South Asia reflected Al-Qaeda’s success at expanding beyond its predominantly Arab base, particularly in Pakistan.

Critically, with the exception of IS, Al-Qaeda’s alliances have been resilient over time. This is true despite ample reasons for its partners to abandon ties, such as the heightened counterterrorism pressure that comes with affiliation to Al-Qaeda; the death of its charismatic leader; and the Islamic State’s efforts to court Al-Qaeda allies. Even the Afghan Taliban remains unwilling to sever ties, even though doing so would eliminate one of the major reasons that the United States will not withdraw from the “forever war” in Afghanistan.

The ConversationThere is a window now for the U.S. to damage Al-Qaeda’s alliances: It has a weak leader and major rival. But that window may be closing as the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate crumbles and Al-Qaeda grooms bin Laden’s son as its future leader.

Tricia Bacon is assistant professor of justice, law and criminology at American University.

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