2015-08-05T172607Z_116046601_GF20000014425_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-NUCLEAR-OBAMA

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Alan Dershowitz

By Alan Dershowitz

Emeritus professor of law, Harvard Law School

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What does the future hold? Will Iran obtain a nuclear arsenal? If so, when? Will it become a "game changer?" If so, how will things change?

"Predicting is hazardous, especially about the future," says a quote attributed to various wise men. But prediction is essential to policy choices, despite the hazards of making a mistake. Some predictive mistakes, however, are more costly than others.

President Obama is staking this deal on a series of predictions—"bets," "rolls of the dice" and "faith"—that include the following:

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There are other unintended consequences that, though unpredictable, may flow directly or indirectly from the deal. They include the following:

To demonstrate how unpredictable the Middle East is, within days of the deal being signed, the king of Saudi Arabia met with the leaders of Hamas, a virulently anti-Israel terrorist organization that is both an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and a client of Iran—both of which the Saudis have long regarded as mortal enemies. But in the Middle East, power attracts, and this deal empowers Iran as never before.

Although the Iranian leadership regards the U.S. as having shown weakness in its negotiation, and although it regards the threat of any military action by the U.S. as having been dissipated, it still understands that America has the most powerful military in the world, that Obama will not be president for long, and that the outcome of the 2016 election is unpredictable. So even if the Iranian regime makes decisions based on power rather than principle, the enduring military and economic power wielded by the U.S. and its allies creates a disincentive toward escalating the conflict—at least until Iran becomes a nuclear weapons power.

Is there any reason to believe that it will be less of a game changer in 10 years than it would be now? That is certainly what the president—and indeed the rest of the world—hopes will happen, but we cannot predict such a positive outcome with any degree of confidence, because although 10 years is a blink of an eye for purposes of assessing dangers to national security, it is an eternity for purposes of making predictions.

That is why this deal is indeed a roll of the dice—or perhaps more aptly a game of Russian roulette for us and our allies. Although the odds of losing in Russian roulette are only one in six, no one would praise a leader who got us into a situation where playing Russian roulette is the best alternative available, especially if we got into that situation by putting our own weapons away.

Having concluded that the negotiations with Iran were deeply flawed and that the resulting deal is extremely dangerous, it might be expected that I would advocate its rejection by Congress by means of overriding the promised presidential veto.

But the latter conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from the former. Perhaps one of the worst consequences of the negotiation and deal is that they put us in a position where rejecting a bad deal may be worse than accepting it. It is impossible to know.

If the deal were to be rejected by Congress, and accepted by Iran, most of the sanctions—those imposed by the Security Council, by our Western European partners, by China and Russia, and even those imposed by the president without congressional approval—would quickly disappear. The crippling sanctions regime would end, and Iran would get much of the hundreds of billions of dollars of sanction relief it has been seeking. Secretary of State John Kerry acknowledged this in an interview on July 19 on Face the Nation:

"If Congress says no to this deal, then there will be no restraints on Iran. There will be no sanctions left. Our friends in this effort will desert us."

Moreover, the military option would remain off the table, because it can be deployed only by the president, not by Congress, and President Obama is now not likely to use military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

When Secretary Kerry said "there will be no restraints on Iran" if Congress rejects the deal, he was telling us and Iran that no military constraints would be imposed, despite statements that all options remain on the table. That is certainly the way the Iranian leaders see it, as evidenced by Ayatollah Ali Khomeini's statement on May 6 that the Iranian nation "does not tolerate negotiation under the shadow of threat" and that the U.S. cannot "do a damn thing." Israeli officials view Kerry's statement as "thinly veiled efforts to muzzle criticism" of the deal.

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My proposal, made in September 2013 and echoed recently by Thomas Friedman, is that Congress should now authorize the president "to use force to prevent Iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapons state." But such a law would merely authorize, not compel, the president "to destroy—without warning or negotiation—any attempt by Tehran to build an atomic bomb." It would be a good step to take, whether or not the presidential veto of a vote disapproving of the deal were upheld.

The result of a congressional rejection of the deal could be a win-win for the Iranian regime, because they would have accomplished their three goals—ending most of the sanctions, taking the military option off the table, and presenting themselves to the international community as reasonable leaders who were willing to sign the deal.

But if Congress were to reject the deal, the Iranians would not feel bound to honor its provisions regarding centrifuges, inspections and other constraints—temporary though they may be—on moving toward becoming a nuclear weapons power. Indeed, there is a cautionary tale to be found in our recent history: The failure of the Republican-controlled Congress to fully implement the terms of President Clinton's nuclear agreement with North Korea provided an excuse for that country to renege on the terms of the deal, and successfully resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

So President Obama may well be correct when he says that the current deal is "a better outcome for America, Israel, and our Arab allies than any other alternative on the table." But even if that were true—and it is speculative at best—it is damning with faint praise if all the available outcomes are bad, and if President Obama got us into the situation when there could have been better alternatives that are now no longer on the table.

This variation on Hobson's choice—call it "Obama's choice"—would not have been necessary had President Obama kept, and communicated to Iran, the promise he repeatedly made before he was re-elected: namely that "we are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons [so] rest assured, we will take no options off the table. We have been clear."

If Iran had been persuaded that the U.S. would never allow it to develop nuclear weapons, and that enduring the crippling sanctions was therefore foolish, it might well have accepted President Obama's original red lines. But because the Obama administration changed its policy after his re-election and the subsequent midterms—from prevention to containment and from permanent to temporary—the Iranians were able to outmaneuver us.

The entirely preventable result may well be that within a decade, Iran will have a nuclear arsenal that in President Obama's own words will "pose a security threat not only to the [Middle East] but also to the United States."

It is possible, of course, that Obama's "bet"—his "roll of the dice"—could produce the result we all hope for: namely a reformed Iran that does not pursue its nuclear weapons ambitions when the deal allows it to continue to spin centrifuges capable of producing nuclear weapons.

If the bet pays off, and the deal encourages Iran to give up its role as a rogue-state sponsor of terrorism that threatens the stability of the Middle East and Israel's existence, and Iran rejoins the international community, then it will become a positive legacy for President Obama—perhaps his most important international accomplishment. This possibility should encourage the Obama administration in its waning months to do everything in its power to move Iran in this direction so that the hope for a good outcome is realized.

But hope is different from "faith," though neither is an appropriate basis on which to "roll the dice" on a nuclear deal that might well threaten the security of the world.

Because the stakes are so high, Congress has an especially important constitutional role to play as the primary institution empowered to serve as a check and balance on the executive branch. Under our Constitution, the power to make long-term foreign policy decisions that affect the security of our nation and the world is vested jointly in the executive and legislative branches. President Obama has sought to diminish the role of Congress with regard to the Iran deal by:

In order to determine whether rejecting the deal at this point would be worse than accepting a bad deal that could have been a lot better, it is imperative that Congress perform its constitutional duty to check and balance the executive branch by asking and demanding answers to the following questions:

If and when these and other important questions about the deal are answered—directly, candidly and unambiguously—Congress will be in a better position to answer the fundamental questions now before it: Would rejecting this deeply flawed deal produce more dangerous results than not rejecting it? If so, what can we now do to assure that Iran will not acquire a nuclear arsenal? The answers to those questions may profoundly affect the future of the world.

Alan Dershowitz is an emeritus professor of law at Harvard Law School. This is extracted from The Case Against the Iran Deal: How Can We Now Stop Iran from Getting Nukes? by Alan Dershowitz, published by RosettaBooks.

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