A Fragile Friendship

For that reason Musharraf was slow to deploy the Army in the tribal areas into which Taliban and Qaeda fighters fled to escape the heavy U.S. bombing campaigns. Many of the tribes are ethnic Pashtun and therefore have deep sympathies for the largely Pashtun Taliban and its Qaeda allies. The military is still haunted by the specter of a bloody, 18-month-long, anti-government tribal insurgency that broke out along the Afghan border in 1973. The Army was called in to crush the separatist revolt and has never divulged the extent of the carnage that led to the insurrection's collapse. Now for the first time since the uprising, the Army has dispatched infantry regulars in large numbers--some 40,000--into the tribal areas to hunt the Taliban and Al Qaeda. But the troops are moving gingerly. "The Army is reluctant to disturb the status quo in the tribal belt in a manner that could provoke an unnecessary backlash and perhaps re-ignite anti-government activity," says Hussain.

Musharraf has stonewalled Washington's requests to allow U.S. troops into the tribal territories. He has also refused repeated American requests to increase the number of U.S. intelligence personnel operating there. Musharraf is intent on keeping their numbers in the dozens, not the hundreds. Those restrictions on the Americans sit well with most officers. "I don't like working with Americans," offers one senior Pakistani officer who says his views reflect those of younger officers. "Their demands keep increasing." Not only are the number of FBI, CIA and U.S. Army personnel working with the Pakistani Army strictly limited, so are their size and color. Pakistan is refusing to allow "blacks, blonds and six-footers" to accompany the troops, according to the senior officer. They have to wear Pakistani Army uniforms, speak local languages and be able to pass as locals.

The Bush administration never tires of praising Musharraf and his military for their flawless cooperation with U.S. forces. But young Pakistani officers may not be doing all they could. "I don't think there is going to be any deliberate disobedience because of the anti-Americanism," says Haqqani. "But a lot of decisions taken at the top can be diluted by the time they reach the bottom." If so, such anti-Western attitudes could significantly slow down, if not sabotage, operations.

While there is no evidence that younger, anti-American officers have disobeyed or watered down orders, Musharraf is eager to show some tangible benefits of the Army's cooperation with the United States. "If Musharraf is willing to let the Pakistan Army continue to do the dirty work for the U.S. in the tribal areas, then he will have to show that the U.S. is delivering the goods," says Hussain. Lately the Americans are trying to come up with some carrots, no matter how small. U.S. officials say that the military-training programs that were canceled in 1990 will resume shortly. The selection process is already underway to choose younger officers for training in the United States. Next month a small joint U.S.-Pakistani naval exercise is scheduled to begin, the first in years. Negotiations are also underway for Washington to supply Pakistan with "some pretty basic military stuff," not planes or tanks but workaday weapons, say American officials. That's a far cry from the military-aid packages of old, but it's a start. The danger for the United States and Musharraf is that it may be too little, too late.

© 2002