The Price Of Cheap Shots

THE CONFLAGRATION ON THE WEST BANK HAS MADE IT obvious that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority has ended (at least, as they say about welfare, ""as we know it''). Neither Netanyahu nor Arafat is willing to continue down the current path, and yet neither has a realistic alternative to offer his people, who are increasingly frustrated and desperate. In this incendiary climate, patience and rationalism must prevail. Whether they can will depend not only on events in the Middle East, but also in the Middle West.

Of the many dangers associated with the renewal of violence in Israel, one of the least noted is that the crisis is taking place in the midst of an American presidential campaign. Soon--perhaps during the first presidential debate--the candidates will be asked how they plan to ""solve'' this problem. In fact, Washington has been only a marginal player during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process--they are called the ""Oslo accords'' for a reason--and it cannot end the conflict if the parties are unwilling to do so themselves. There is little for the United States to do other than what it is currently doing: implore each side to live up to its commitments.

The candidates are unlikely to admit this. During a campaign they have every incentive to overstate the potential U.S. role, and outbid each other by promising bold and decisive action, particularly to a key domestic constituency--in this case, Ameriican Jews.

So far this process has not spiraled out of control. President Clinton, properly secure with his credentials as a friend of Israel, has not turned this foreign crisis into a domestic opportunity. And Senator Dole has generally been disciplined and sober about foreign policy throughout the campaign. On the Middle East, as on Bosnia, China and Russia, he has made clear his criticisms of the administration's policies, but has resisted the urge to dramatically outflank Clinton--saddling himself with a set of extreme positions in the process.

Clinton himself was not so wise. During the 1992 campaign, he adopted a series of positions solely to distance himself from George Bush, and then ended up disavowing his own campaign statements once in office. Having accused Bush of ""coddling'' the regime in Beijing, he then extended most-favored-nation status to China, decoupling trade from considerations of human rights. Having criticized the Bush administration's ""cruel'' and ""immoral'' policy toward Haitian refugees, he ended up embracing Bush's policy before he was even inaugurated. And having compared events in Bosnia to the Holocaust, he failed to live up to his own rhetoric. The public spectacle of the president of the United States repeatedly backpedaling has cost Clinton--and the country--a great deal in terms of credibility. The campaign's cheapest shots ended up being expensive.

Clinton is not alone in finding that a good campaign can make bad policy. In 1960, John Kennedy vigorously denounced Dwight Eisenhower's ""New Look'' nuclear policy. It had created a dangerous ""missile gap,'' Kennedy argued, and he demanded a large buildup of nuclear weapons and a counter-insurgency force capable of fighting ""brush-fire'' wars in the Third World. Once in office, Kennedy found there was a small problem with his platform: there was no missile gap. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara broke the news in a background briefing soon after JFK took office. Yet the buildup went ahead as planned, prompting a Soviet response, and the faith in counterinsurgency led in no small measure to our intervention in Vietnam.