Washington Cries Wolf

This makes sense. If China hopes to attract educated soldiers of the sort necessary for high-tech warfare, or to merely placate its troops, it's going to have to start paying them more, for salaries and benefits haven't kept up with the country's boom. "Two decades ago, a military man was an attractive spouse," one Chinese researcher told me last week. "But today no one in a city like Shanghai lets their daughter marry one. They just don't earn enough."

The Middle Kingdom, moreover, sits in the middle of a tough neighborhood. It's not only the U.S. fleet off its shores Beijing must contend with. Of China's four nuclear neighbors—Russia, India, Pakistan and North Korea—two (Russia and India) spend almost as much on defense as China does (so does nonnuclear Japan), and at least two (Pakistan and North Korea) are potentially unstable. Just a generation ago, China was defeated in war by tiny Vietnam.

The Pentagon's report suggests there is some uncertainty about China's intentions toward its neighbors. Yet in recent years, Beijing's local behavior has been fairly benign: it has settled border disputes with six neighbors, joined and sponsored multilateral institutions and become the hub of a booming network of Asian trade and investment. Far from uncertain, China's strategic intentions seem relatively clear and stable: to promote peace and prosperity.

Beijing has one other pressing local concern—Taiwan, which it regards as a breakaway province. China's government has said that it seeks peaceful reunification with the island, but Beijing reserves the right to use force in response if Taipei declares independence. China also disputes the sovereignty of some resource-rich islands in the surrounding seas, but it has shown a willingness to compromise on such claims. China sees both these issues as domestic, so National People's Congress spokesman Jiang Enzhu was surely sincere when he stated on March 4 that "China's limited armed forces are totally for the purpose of safeguarding independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity." In recent years, it has been Taiwan—not China—that has threatened the status quo.

To sum up: Beijing's strategic priorities today are to maintain missile bases across the Taiwan Strait, build a substantial short-range naval presence, improve its anti-satellite technology and seek other means to balance U.S. power in the event of a regional conflict. There's little evidence China has greater strategic ambitions—let alone any desire for the sort of global hegemony that American alarmists sometimes warn of.

Given all this, what explains the Pentagon's position? Former assistant secretary of Defense Charles Freeman, who was President Nixon's interpreter at his epochal meeting with Mao Zedong in 1972, argues that the U.S. military's hype is motivated by a "need to justify R&D and procurement." Freeman, who has participated in behind-the-scenes "track two" sessions with Chinese military brass, also believes U.S. officials often "blame the Chinese for a lack of transparency that [actually] reflects only our own intellectual laziness, linguistic incompetence and complacent ignorance." Perhaps. But it is also a means to promote deeper military-to-military links and information exchanges with China—a controversial course for Beijing (and also for some in Washington), but one that is already underway. On February 29, for example, the two countries agreed to establish a telephone link between their respective defense departments. Military talks are also planned. These are hopeful signs.

Still, the Pentagon's insinuations could inflame bilateral relations and distract Washington from the more limited but very real threats posed by China's modest buildup—and the possibility that a Taiwan crisis could spiral out of control. The Bush administration, which began its tenure with a hostile view of Beijing similar to the Pentagon's, has since changed course dramatically, recently working closely with China to avoid conflict. Seems that almost everyone in Washington has finally gotten the message—except the Pentagon.

© 2008