Saying 'Oui' to NATO

By announcing France's return to NATO's fold, Sarkozy is simply acknowledging a reality already well-known to military officers and diplomats, but one that previous French governments have failed to capitalize on, for fear of the domestic backlash.

Yet capitalizing on his NATO move is precisely what Sarkozy intends to do, both in Washington and in the European Union. By showing that France is America's trusted friend again, Sarkozy hopes to gain influence on American policy, and, in particular, on lifting the longtime U.S. veto on European defense.

Sarkozy knows that ever since 1954 and the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC), France has never been able to rally other Europeans to the idea of a European defense policy, for fear of antagonizing the United States, or weakening NATO. What Sarkozy expects from Washington in exchange for rejoining NATO is strong public support in favor of European defense cooperation, presumably led by himself, Gordon Brown and Angela Merkel.

The EU is the other forum where Sarkozy expects major returns for his NATO move. Starting July 1, France will hold the EU presidency, and Sarkozy hopes to obtain major progress on European defense. Having successfully fathered the Lisbon Treaty (with Merkel's help) and taken Europe out of a morass created by the failure of the French and Dutch referendums of 2005, Sarkozy hopes to consolidate his own leadership role by boosting European defense and diplomatic ambitions on the world stage. For this reason, Sarkozy has insisted publically again and again that France's return to NATO and EDC must go hand in hand. Sarkozy knows full well that he can sell NATO to the French only if he can show progress on the European front.

With this in mind, the key question—and the main risk for Sarkozy—is whether his partners on both sides of the Atlantic can be trusted to return the favor. If they leave him out in the cold, a year from now he'll be facing opponents on the left and right who will accuse him of selling French independence in exchange for nothing.

In this complicated gambit, the forecast, ironically, looks more promising on the other side of the Atlantic than it looks in Europe.

After years of devastating unilateralism and anti-European rhetoric, the Bush administration has given Sarkozy positive words on European defense. But what remains to be seen is whether the change is for real--and not just cosmetic—and more importantly whether it will be continued by the next administration. With his big announcement in Bucharest, Sarkozy is assuming that the United States will remain interested in NATO—and in France's involvement in leading NATO. But no one at this point knows who the next American president will be, or what she or he will do vis-à-vis NATO. Will America's war fatigue lead to retrenchement and isolation, more unilateralism, or to a new era of American multinational engagement?