Saying 'Oui' to NATO

And assuming America remains engaged, will the country still be focused on its "old" European allies, or will she be looking for new partners in the gulf or in Asia, such as India ?

The second major risk has to do with the Europeans themselves. One of the key reasons why Europeans have been essentially satisfied with the status quo (zero European defense, 100 percent U.S. leadership, and plenty of complaints about U.S. leadership) is precisely because this is the most comfortable and cheapest defense posture for "post-historic" societies.

Tired of their long history of warfare, today's European societies have given up on dreams of powers and largely prefer the role of chief commentator (and critic) of U.S. action, spending as little as possible on defense (usually less than 1 percent of GDP, compared with 3.5 percent in the U.S. and 2 percent in France and the U.K.). And when forced to send soldiers to dangerous places, the Europeans do their best to make sure they don't have to fight.

Sarkozy will hold the EU presidency for the second half of this year. By the end of the year, he will have succeeded—or failed—to convince the 26 other nations to take serious steps toward building a true defense community, not as a substitute but as a complement to NATO. Such steps could include a common objective of defense spending at around 2 percent of GDP, a joint European force of 60,000 soldiers from the six largest states (France, Britain, Italy, Poland, Germany, Spain) and a common policy on missile defense and antiterrorism tactics.

Even so, none of these proposals looks very likely these days. Let's hope that Sarkozy can succeed.

The writer is a member of the French National Assembly and a former president of NATO's Parliamentary Assembly. He wrote the defense and foreign-policy platform of Nicolas Sarkozy during last year's presidential election.

© 2008