http://tomrancich.com/resources/articles.php?obj=article&oid=49&momId=47
Tom Rancich , Lieutenant Commander and former SEAL, prognosticated that the Navy was vulnerable to a Cole-like attack well before it ever happened. Like Cassandra, his advice was ignored but his article in the Naval Institute newsletter laid it all out. I wonder how many other military professionals believe as he does, that America's best response in the aftermath of the Cole would have been to buttress our position there, rather than retreat. What would truly have honoured the lives lost in the Cole?
So it was with such a sense of deja vu that I read this Newsweek article. At least it seems, to me, that Gates understands the need to have a show of strength.
Bluff and Bloodshed
Email To A Friend
Please fill in the following information and we'll email this link.
1. Even if outgunned, Iran will not back down from a fight.
In 1988 the Iranians surprised American intelligence officers with their "aggressiveness and boldness," says Wise. In one of the shootouts during the battle in April 1988 an Iranian guided missile patrol boat confronted three U.S. warships. "Despite radio warnings that the Americans intended to sink it, the patrol boat captain did not surrender and instead attacked," says Wise. "Later in the battle two Iranian frigates left the safety of port to join the fight against what they surely knew were overwhelming odds."
2. Low-tech weapons are effective in naval conflict.
"Modern technology remains weak at detecting undersea mines," says Wise. But mines are not the only problem. In the 1980s, as now, the Iranians used "swarming" tactics against larger merchant and naval vessels, sending relatively small boats at high speeds buzzing around and near the U.S. ships. The same thing happened in January this year, and possibly—the boats were never identified—just last week around a merchant ship on contract to the U.S. Navy.
3. Fight fire with fire.
In 1988 the most effective way to combat the Iranians turned out to be with weapons similar in scale to their own. Special Operations Forces using stealth helicopters from bases built on huge oil barges in the northern gulf effectively shut down Iranian mine-laying activity there.
By contrast, the billion-dollar guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes, gunning for Iranians near the Strait of Hormuz, fought a battle against a swarm of Iranian gunboats in July 1988 that was inconclusive.
What was memorable about that day was that in the heat of the moment the Vincennes mistook a civilian airliner overhead for an Iranian warplane and shot it down, killing all 290 people aboard.
Of course, much has changed in two decades, but the military situation in the gulf that was confusing and dangerous in 1988 is in fact much more complicated and dangerous now.
My Take
Each Newsweek reader is different—and now your Newsweek can be, too. Use this page to create a experience that's personalized for you and your interests. My Take: it makes Newsweek whatever you want it to be.









Discuss