The Other Mideast Talks

If President George W. Bush truly wants to leave a legacy of peacemaking in the Middle East, he's looking in the wrong place. Instead of focusing exclusively on Israeli-Palestinian talks, Bush should do more to encourage renewed Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

The United States has much to gain strategically from renewed Israeli-Syrian dialogue. Syria could be pressed to play a more constructive role in the region—instead of being a spoiler or, worse, turning into a full-fledged rogue state.

In recent months Israeli and Syrian leaders have been exchanging positive messages through Turkish mediators. Unlike the weak Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, Syrian President Bashar Assad can actually deliver on a peace deal with Israel. The Israeli-Syrian track can move faster than Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, where the two sides are still far apart on the central issues: Israeli settlements, the fate of Palestinian refugees and the final status of Jerusalem. By contrast, the Syrians and Israelis mainly need to negotiate over the return of the Golan Heights, a strategic terrain that Israel has occupied since the 1967 Middle East war.

An Israeli-Syrian peace deal is possible by the end of the Bush presidency, but it won't happen without the deep involvement of the administration, which is still trying to isolate Syria. On May 7, Bush extended U.S. sanctions against Syria for one more year.

Turkish leaders are not expecting the Bush administration to support these talks, according to an Arab diplomat in Damascus. But the Turks are taking a longer view: they hope to get the Syrians and Israelis discussing details, to build confidence between the two sides and to develop a framework for an agreement that could be in place when a new U.S. administration takes office next year. Assad seems happy to negotiate under Turkish auspices, but he's unlikely to sign a peace deal without an American president at the table.

Both Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert have something to gain by negotiating, even unofficially. (Indeed, Olmert told NEWSWEEK's Lally Weymouth in an interview last week that he was "looking forward" to negotiating with the Syrian leader.) They can be involved in a process and show the world that they want peace. But for Olmert it might not be enough to save him from internal Israeli scandals and growing calls for his resignation. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who would replace Olmert until new elections were held, is believed to be even more adamant about the need to negotiate with Syria. "Because of our good relations with both Syria and Israel, we were asked by both of them to effect better communications. We've been speaking to the leaders of both countries," Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told NEWSWEEK recently. "It's important for us to try to gain some ground. If we can help achieve peace in the Middle East, that will have a major positive impact on the region."

By organizing secret meetings between low-level officials and advisers, the Turks are also hoping to defuse tensions between Israel and Syria, which have been escalating since Israeli warplanes bombed a site in the Syrian desert in September. U.S. and Israeli officials say that Syria was in the initial stages of developing a nuclear reactor with help from North Korea—a claim Syria denies. The Arab diplomat noted that ongoing talks would reduce the possibility of fighting—accidental or planned—along the Golan. It's an act of de-escalation through diplomacy, even if the mediation will move slowly.

Even without a regional settlement, Israel has much to gain from a deal over the Golan. It would mean not only a peace treaty with Damascus but an end of Syrian aid to what is now Israel's most dangerous enemy: Hizbullah, the Lebanese Shiite militia that did surprisingly well in its war with a far superior Israeli army in the summer of 2006. On May 9, Hizbullah dispatched hundreds of heavily armed fighters into West Beirut, and within 12 hours it had altered Lebanon's delicate political balance. Hizbullah's military victory—in which it quickly routed Sunni militiamen, took control of their political offices and shut down media outlets owned by the Sunni leader Saad Hariri—is likely to bolster Assad's position in any negotiations.