The Other Mideast Talks

Even without a regional settlement, Israel has much to gain from a deal over the Golan. It would mean not only a peace treaty with Damascus but an end of Syrian aid to what is now Israel's most dangerous enemy: Hizbullah, the Lebanese Shiite militia that did surprisingly well in its war with a far superior Israeli army in the summer of 2006. On May 9, Hizbullah dispatched hundreds of heavily armed fighters into West Beirut, and within 12 hours it had altered Lebanon's delicate political balance. Hizbullah's military victory—in which it quickly routed Sunni militiamen, took control of their political offices and shut down media outlets owned by the Sunni leader Saad Hariri—is likely to bolster Assad's position in any negotiations.

Publicly, the Bush administration has been lukewarm to the Turkish effort. "If Syria and Israel wish to pursue peace, the United States is never against peace," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the American Jewish Committee on April 29. But she quickly added, "It's been difficult to see Syrian behavior that has the prospect of being more stabilizing in the region, rather than the destabilizing behavior that we're seeing."

Unofficially, the administration could be sending overtures to Syria. Jeffrey Feltman, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs (and the former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon), met for two hours earlier this month in Washington with Syria's ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha. It was one of the highest-level meetings between a U.S. and Syrian official since Washington cut off top-echelon contacts in early 2005. Moustapha reportedly left on a flight to Damascus a few hours after the meeting.

After Saddam Hussein's ouster the Bush administration accused Syria of sheltering Iraqi Baathist leaders and allowing Islamic militants to slip into Iraq to fight U.S. forces. In 2004 Bush imposed economic sanctions against Damascus and tried to isolate it. That policy accelerated after the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, in which top Syrian officials have been implicated by a United Nations investigation.

In response to America's cold shoulder, Assad's regime became more dependent on Iran, which helped shore up the Syrian economy with construction investments and cheap oil. Damascus also enhanced its alliance with Hamas, Hizbullah and the renegade Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Assad knows the United States cannot find a way out of Iraq without his help. But just to be safe, he keeps his connections to Hamas, Hizbullah and Sadr as potential bargaining chips that can shape events in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq.

Syria has consistently said that full peace is possible, but only if every inch of the Golan is returned. In January 2000, President Bill Clinton led marathon talks between Hafez Assad—Bashar's father—and then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Those discussions collapsed over a sliver of land, about 100 meters wide, that would have given Syria access to the Sea of Galilee, a major source of water for Israel.

Ultimately, the United States can get more out of Assad in exchange for the Golan than it can by isolating him. If there are serious negotiations, Washington can demand that Assad stop interfering in Lebanon and Iraq, carry out domestic reforms and drop Syrian support for Hamas and other Palestinian groups that reject peace with Israel. Right now the United States and Europe have little leverage over Assad, because he remains isolated. But Turkey has provided a new opening; it would be a shame if the Bush administration squanders it.

Mohamad Bazzi, the former Middle East bureau chief for New York's Newsday, is the Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

© 2008