Let the Second-Guessing Begin!

Poor Strategy Clinton's failure to organize in the caucus states will go down as one of the worst tactical decisions in modern political history. But it was only part of a larger strategic error. The campaign was based on the idea that Obama would be eliminated on Super Tuesday. This might have made sense in 2006, when she was first planning her run. But by early 2007 it was clear that Obama would actually outraise Clinton, with the Internet as an inexhaustible supply of small donations. This meant that the traditional reason that candidates drop out—lack of funds—wouldn't apply to Obama in 2008. Clinton had plenty of time to recognize this reality and design a plan B for what would happen if she didn't wipe Obama out early. But even the most elementary planning for contingencies—like filing delegate slates in post-Super Tuesday states—was neglected.

By some accounts, Clinton would have been better off skipping the Iowa caucuses, which Obama won big. But this wouldn't have worked for her any better than it did for Rudy Giuliani. She might have helped herself there, however, had she avoided harsh Christmastime attacks on Obama in a state that is famous for punishing candidates who aren't nice.

A more supple strategy would have also led to adjustment of Clinton's message. Had she switched from inevitable and experienced to working-girl-tribune-of-the-forgotten-middle-class on February 1 instead of April 1, she might have won the nomination.

Weak Management The failed strategy is the product of having the wrong people in charge. Mark Penn, the chief strategist, wrote a book in which he describes the country as a series of tiny distinct constituencies—exactly the wrong analysis in a year when the public has a thirst for unity and commonality. As a veteran of President Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign, he naturally and fatally used the old game plan, positioning Hillary as a cautious quasi-incumbent who couldn't possibly be seen as admitting error on her Iraq vote because that might weaken her in a general election. And a pollster in charge of a campaign is always a bad idea.
Patti Solis Doyle, the campaign manager, was in over her head, and communications director Howard Wolfson convinced himself that being rude to reporters (or complaining to their bosses) would somehow improve the tone of the coverage. His subordinates followed this approach to press relations, sometimes verbally abusing TV bookers and others in the media. The problem with "working the refs" (a basketball term for riding referees in hopes of a good call later on) is that, while it can sometimes succeed in the short term, it's always a long-term loser. Reporters wait in the weeds.

Clinton is responsible for personnel decisions; her poor judgment of people, overemphasis on loyalty and testy reaction to anyone delivering bad news made her slow to recognize the need for a management shakeup. On the morning after Ronald Reagan won the New Hampshire primary in 1980, he fired his campaign manager, John Sears, who was responsible for his loss in the Iowa caucuses and for a lot of bad blood with supporters. Had Clinton done the same after her New Hampshire win, she might have stabilized earlier.

Arrogance The reason Clinton didn't adjust more quickly, alienated many potential donors, antagonized the press and had so much trouble winning over uncommitted superdelegates, is that from start to finish her campaign gave off a distinct whiff of arrogance. Campaign staffers, internalizing that victory was inevitable, felt that Clinton's stature in the party gave them license to play rough with anyone who wouldn't come along. So early on donors coughed up money, superdelegates pledged their support, and media outlets bought into meaningless national polls showing her way ahead, but few were happy about it. Unlike the diehard Clinton lovers, they felt intimidated. So later, when she desperately needed their support, they weren't there for her.