Partially True Confessions

How did the Bush administration go from its "Axis of Evil" approach to Pyongyang to "Food for Talks"? U.S. strategy has long been to force North Korea to choose between keeping its nukes—but remaining isolated—and giving up its weapons in return for greater prosperity and integration into the world community. The problem is that China and South Korea are more worried about a North Korean collapse than about its weapons, and have acted as enablers, helping Kim Jong Il to survive despite the U.S. pressure.

Bush thus wasted most of his presidency trying to isolate a nation with powerful supporters on both of its borders. He started negotiating seriously only in August 2005. Now, in the twilight of his presidency, the North Koreans could decide to stonewall on any further concessions as they did to the Clinton administration at the end, thinking they might get a better deal from the next president.

So what's the best we can hope for? As long as Kim remains in power, there will be lingering uncertainty about North Korea's true nuclear assets. If we're lucky, the world community will get fairly solid assurances that Pyongyang has ended its nuclear weapons-building. But there will be less certainty about its nuclear-arms dealing. In the past, North Korea has been associated with missile or nuclear cooperation with Syria and virtually every major oil exporter, especially Iran. With oil prices at record levels, these customers are flush. The ultimate nightmare is that Pyongyang will cooperate with non-state actors such as Al Qaeda. And there will be still less certainty about the size of North Korea's arsenal. Thus prudent military planners in Washington and elsewhere must continue to assume that Pyongyang will retain some nuclear capacity for the foreseeable future. That's not ideal. But it's probably an outcome we can live with—especially since we have very little choice.

Noland is author of “Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas” and “Korea After Kim Jong-il.”

© 2008