Proxy Attack?

What do you read into Taliban denials of responsibility?
Not much. Some groups are keen to claim bombings, some aren't. And if the generic "Taliban" denied it, what does that mean? The people issuing denials could well be spokesmen for the Mullah Omar group. It's such an amorphous group, who knows? It's fragmenting on a daily basis.

How do you assess that an area is under Taliban control?
It's not so much Taliban control, it's having the presence and the ability to disrupt security. That could be launching a kidnapping, or a crude bomb, or a high-profile attack. It's all a question of perception, which is why [our study is based on] whether they've actually heard of or seen or believe to have seen Talibs within their locale. The map is a point-in-time snapshot.  But it's important, because it demonstrates how the Taliban has a rule of fear even now. People are very scared of the fact that they run things so close to Kabul now.

Where are they coming from?
They're essentially coming from the south, using the main artery to come up from Kandahar and Helmand provinces. They're setting up a lot of checkpoints as well, so our researchers have to be very careful. This is a road that we've used freely in the past and now can't use, which is a strong indication of how successfully the Taliban are moving around the country.

What about the interplay between local warlords and the Taliban?
In the mid-1990s, the Taliban brought stability to a chaotic situation, and they were welcomed by these tribal leaders as white knights. Now, it's a different situation. The tribal leaders are increasingly keen to reassert their authority over their regions, so if they know the Taliban are in town, it disrupts that dynamic and they're less likely to be as accommodating. But in Afghanistan, allegiances shift day to day, and it can come down to who can offer them the most money or security. Tribal leaders might sign a deal with Talibs, saying, "Leave our village alone or tie our economic community into your black market, and we'll make sure you're OK." We hear stories in the south of large families having to put one son in the Taliban and another in the Afghan National Army, because they're hedging their bets.

What conclusions can you make about the resurgence of the Taliban based on all of this?
We're clearly seeing them still as a potent force within the country. It's a really troubling development that IEDs are being increasingly used. Some military commanders say that's because they're on the run and they can't maintain a physical base anymore, but with an insurgency that's free-footed and becoming more adept at these asymmetric tactics, it's becoming more and more difficult for the military to defeat them in the classic sense. Unfortunately, we're seeing Afghanistan's security situation deteriorate, and it's difficult to see how it's going to turn around, at least in the short term.

© 2008