What Colombia’s Daring Raid Can Teach The United States

The rescue of 15 military and civilian hostages by Colombia's Army on July 2 was more stealth and bewilderment than shock and awe. Instead of hitting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with air raids, the Army infiltrated the group and tricked its fighters into handing over prisoners to government forces. It was a strategy low on brute force and high on inside knowledge of the enemy. As such, it represents not only a major departure for Colombia but perhaps the best new model for combating terror groups worldwide.

Such an operation was unthinkable a decade ago, when Colombia's army seemed to be stalemated against the FARC, which then boasted 20,000 guerrillas and raked in hundreds of millions of dollars annually from drug smuggling and kidnappings. But a big increase in its military budget allowed Colombia to double the size of its armed forces to 500,000 and train more men in special operations. Then, after 9/11, Washington permitted U.S.-supplied aircraft and communications-intercepting equipment (previously restricted to narcotics stings) for counterterrorism use.

Colombia's army began going after FARC strongholds via small units with helicopter support. The troops also redirected their focus from body counts to capturing the FARC's leadership and rescuing hostages. In 2003, Bogota also intensified its information war, using radio and air-dropped fliers to offer guerrillas amnesty and jobs if they deserted. Since then, hundreds of FARC fighters have defected each month, and the group's numbers have dwindled to 9,000. Meanwhile, a $100 million fund to cultivate informants enticed FARC members to betray each other and feed the Army critical information on communications methods. In March, this intelligence led to a raid that killed a top leader—and then to the July rescue. Now most analysts agree that Latin America's most feared terrorist militia has been crippled.

Key to Colombia's success was its investment in HUMINT techniques that the U.S. military has largely failed to implement in its pursuit of Al Qaeda. "We became enamored with technical intelligence ... during the Clinton administration at the expense of human intelligence and it was a huge mistake that we've been trying to make up for," says David Spencer, a counterterrorism expert at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. "The Colombians have people who have spent their entire careers studying the FARC, learning their habits and ways of thinking. And it's that extensive preparation that made this rescue attempt possible." If the FARC's demise is any indication, counterterrorism's future will depend on a country's human intelligence network, not just its arms and its technology.

© 2008