When the Good Guys are the Bad Guys

Mohammed Waeli also denied any accusations of wrongdoing in a phone interview with NEWSWEEK. When asked about the fact that several Iraqi officials had accused him and his brother of oil smuggling, Waeli grew agitated. "What is this official's name?" he demanded. "I will not answer this question unless you give me his name to be able to talk frankly about this subject." When the governor calmed down, he claimed that Ismail had been living in Kuwait for the past two years and rarely visited Basra. "These accusations come from political reasons and they are not true," Waeli said. "I challenge them to prove I am smuggling oil. Those people who make these accusations are smuggling oil themselves."

When Operation Charge of the Knights kicked off in March, few Iraqis, even government officials, had much confidence in Maliki's forces. The Sadrists and their Mahdi Army fighters saw the operation as a personal attack and fought back hard. More than 1,000 soldiers deserted early on. Maliki's headquarters were pounded by mortars and rockets night and day. "There was a 72-hour period where it looked like the [Iraqi] Army was going to fall apart," says one U.S. official familiar with the Basra operation, who asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. "At one point we thought [Maliki] was kidnapped: there were just two blue dots on the map—the Army—surrounded by a sea of red." Ismail was on the list of the criminals the security forces were going after in Basra, and Maliki kept the operation a secret from the governor. But whatever ideas Maliki may have had about confronting Mohammed Waeli directly were quickly abandoned. "He was warned about how dangerous it could be to arrest the governor," says Latif.

Even though Maliki called Waeli in for a public dressing-down during the operation, he remains in his post. According to one official at the meeting, Maliki criticized the local government and blamed much of the insecurity on them. As soon as Maliki was finished talking, Waeli got up to leave the room, but the prime minister asked him to sit down again. Waeli eventually left without saying a word.

The Basra operation has generally been portrayed as a success. Several militia leaders were killed by U.S. airstrikes and Special Operations forces, while rank-and-file fighters melted away after an Iranian-brokered truce was signed. Families are again strolling along the Shatt al-Arab, a river formed by the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates, at sunset. After dark, young couples flirt beneath gazebos dotting the corniche. Booze is being sold again, albeit discreetly, and CD salesmen now openly offer Arabic and Western pop music. The FPS guards suspected of oil smuggling have been packed off for retraining, replaced by Iraqi Army soldiers.

But oil smuggling continues: on a recent visit, the creeks south of the city were again full of boats, waiting to load up with oil. Atheel Salman, director of the Abu Fulus port, says the smuggling is virtually impossible to stop. And as long as Waeli remains in office, there's a chance that his Fadhila loyalists could resume their operations. For his part, Waeli says he's not leaving unless he loses in the provincial elections, which are supposed to be held later this year. "All the attempts to remove me have failed because … I was elected by the people," he says. "No official can remove me from my position except by legal means." Even that is likely to be a fight.

With reporting by Hussam Ali

© 2008