MR Lawrence, the ISI, the Army, and the FC are in bed with the T-ban. You cannot tell the P-stani's of impending ops, it goes from our mouths-to the T-ban's ear. 6 months ago there were 30+ camps, the P-stani's, when they clearly were not going to stand up, the number shot up to almost 100. Now, there are over 157 camps. So, who let that happen? Why does former ISI chief Hamid Gul attend Taliban meetings? Wake up. They are NOT going to help. NATO can do a whole lot better, but they have let us down. We need to smash those camps ourselves, then put a couple Batts. on choppers to clean out the rats nests. Man, people keep thinking we can stop this w/out hitting them where they live. No way. We are sitting ducks in some of those OP's on the border. Wish we could hit them where they live, NOT where I live. Good day, Sir.
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The Problem Is Pakistan
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Just as in the '80s, the main problem is Pakistan. Border areas nominally ruled by Islamabad have become Taliban safe havens, with weapons, drugs and Qaeda fighters being smuggled across with impunity. Despite Pakistani denials, the CIA has made well-grounded allegations that some government elements, including officers in Inter-Services Intelligence, are supporting the radicals.
So how should the next U.S. president tackle this problem and avoid falling into the Soviets' trap? The Taliban insurgency is smaller than the anti-Soviet one was, although it's apparently better coordinated. And the Allies' technological advantage is greater than the Soviets' was. A surge of forces might help better control Afghanistan's borders and target insurgents. But simply throwing soldiers at the problem, especially at the levels the candidates have proposed, won't stop the infiltration of fighters from Pakistan or resolve Afghanistan's many domestic difficulties.
Periodically targeting Qaeda elements in Pakistan's lawless border regions—an option Obama has said he would consider under some circumstances—might be helpful, too, but it would do little to stop the influx of gunmen into Afghanistan. And such military strikes would infuriate Islamabad and throw Pakistani politics into turmoil. A full-fledged invasion would be immensely costly and likely have even worse consequences.
It would be far better to find some way to get the Pakistanis to help voluntarily. The United States has already tried this tack using diplomatic persuasion and large amounts of mostly military aid, but to no avail. Washington could increase pressure by threatening to shut off the tap unless Islamabad played ball. But such a confrontational approach would also be dangerous and likely not work either.
The harsh realities of the situation in Afghanistan—including Pakistan's meddlesome role—can no longer be ignored. The stakes for the United States and the region are enormous, and good options are in short supply. No quick fix will solve the problem—certainly not the infusion of a few more American brigades. The Soviet saga shows the danger of a focused, military-only approach. Talking tough, as the presidential candidates try to bolster their national-security credentials, is not likely to help, and the sooner we recognize that, the better. Building a stable Afghanistan will be a long-term, uncertain effort. Without a concerted bipartisan approach, no policy is likely to survive or succeed. Meanwhile, the political warfare is distracting us from the necessary fight.
Abramowitz, a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, was assistant secretary of State for Intelligence and Research from 1985 to 1989.
© 2008
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