If Iran is not already working at full speed to develop nuclear weapons (it insists its intentions are entirely peaceful), it could be expected to pick up the pace now, and not least as a deterrent to Russian expansion in its direction. On the other hand, if it pushes too hard and too fast, Moscow may start to see nuclear-armed mullahs as a dangerous distraction, and Tehran would have to take into account the possibility that Russia, in its new and aggressive posture, would act directly and ruthlessly to eliminate the threat. Under current circumstances, who would come to Iran's defense? Even if the Iranians decide to slow down their nuclear program, or stop it, they will have to worry about Moscow's long-term designs on oil and natural-gas deposits around the Caspian Sea, where Russia already has a fleet and already disputes Iran's claims to a large portion of the resources beneath the water.
The incoming American administration could "play on those kinds of fears and take advantage of the opportunities," says Nasr. "But to play that kind of game you need a lot of clarity of vision." That hasn't really been the hallmark of the Bush administration, nor of McCain's rhetoric, nor of Barack Obama's talk about talking. Indeed, the basic policy framework of the United States is built on fundamental contradictions. "We talk as if Iran is the biggest threat, but we act as if Russia is," says Nasr.
Thus Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed a deal with Warsaw on Tuesday to put part of the American ballistic-missile shield in Poland, having long asserted that the purpose was to thwart Iran. But, um, Iran has no intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its attempt to launch a rocket into space over the weekend appears to have quite literally fizzled. Moscow, meanwhile, has hundreds of perfectly serviceable ICBMs. (We sometimes send our own American astronauts to the International Space Station on Russia's reliable rockets.) It's hardly surprising the Russians think the purpose of the American missile shield is to eliminate what's left of the old strategic balance and give Washington a potential first-strike capability against Moscow. That sort of confrontation, if overplayed, could slip toward the Strangelovian standoffs of the cold war or, conceivably, something worse.
In fact, the new Great Game, like the old one, will be a long narrative of intrigue and confrontation in which there is no sudden or decisive resolution. Realism will dictate efforts to improve relations with states on Russia's periphery whether or not their ideologies are compatible with American democratic ideals. Another Iran scholar, Gary Sick at Columbia University, believes the policymakers remaining in the Bush administration have actually come to understand this, albeit very late. "After 9/11 their world view was that the United States had limitless power," says Sick. "I don't think they believe that anymore. And if you really believe you have to husband your power in ways that are more cost effective, you have to change our approach to Iran." It won't be easy. The Iranians are hard bargainers with regional ambitions of their own, but they are not irrational, and their primary interest is security. Oddly enough, Washington may find that the U.S. benefits by helping them feel safer, not more threatened.
© 2008
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