Playing Russian Roulette in Kiev

Four years ago, in the wake of the orange revolution, Ukraine captured the world's attention. The jubilation has long died down, to be replaced by frustration with the country's lively but exceedingly chaotic politics. Late last month Kiev's political theater struck a new low when the president's office formally accused Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko—the former orange princess and still nominally an ally of the head of state—of high treason, and asked the national-security service to investigate allegations that she is an agent of the Kremlin. Result: havoc in Parliament, collapse of the ruling coalition and the likelihood of a new parliamentary election, barely a year after the last one.

The most recent round of chaos reflects the vast schism that has long existed in Ukraine, but has been thrust onto center stage by Russia's incursion into Georgia. At the time of the Georgia crisis, according to the Segodnya newspaper, 51 per-cent of the population of Ukraine's western regions sided with Tbilisi, while 56 percent in the east backed Moscow. On the parliamentary floor this month, while one faction proudly sat against the backdrop of the Georgian flag, another faction's leader moved to recognize Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's in-dependence. Though such fault lines are nothing new in a diverse and fractious nation that counts no fewer than three Orthodox churches, plus a Greek Orthodox community that recognized the pope's authority, the trouble in the Caucasus may this time create a political earthquake with enormous consequences.

More than two thirds of the electorate—east, west or center, whatever their international preferences—want to be in the European Union and at the same time maintain good and close relations with Russia. Membership in NATO would destroy any chance at the latter. Tymoshenko senses this, and basically shares the position. Although she once authored a piece in the U.S. journal Foreign Affairs calling for Russia's containment, and later signed a petition promoting Ukraine's membership in NATO, she is, if anything, a pragmatist who recognizes the complexities of her own country and its international environment. But while her parliamentary coalition has collapsed, the deeply unpopular incumbent president, Viktor Yushchenko, has vowed to press on with his bid for re-election in the early 2010 presidential elections, building his campaign around a promise to link Ukraine with the West, against Russia.

On Ukrainian Independence Day, Aug. 24, he presided over a rare and controversial display of military hardware on Kiev's main avenue, and said that neutrality was no option for his country. He has taken a tough line in Crimea as well, where the Russian Navy shares its historic base in Sevastopol with Ukraine. The Russian warships that were ordered to Georgia's Black Sea coast are based there, and to prevent them from freely slipping in and out of the port in the future, Yushchenko has decreed that Russia must notify Ukraine in advance of their intentions, and declare the armaments they will be carrying when crossing the border at sea. The Russians can be expected to give symbolic concessions, but no one should imagine that they will accept that their destroyers will have to go through Customs. This is a particularly troublesome situation, especially if a small Ukrainian craft happens to be damaged by a Russian warship, and sinks in the shared harbor.

There is more than enough combustible stuff onshore as well, with a dispute over the Black Sea Fleet's infrastructure unresolved, and Ukrainian nationalist vigilantes and Russian veterans (who chant that Sevastopol is a city of Russian sailors) facing off against one another in heated, but so far peaceful, shouting matches in the streets. There is also another element: Crimean Tatars, once owners of Crimea, then Russia's conquered subjects, and more recently Stalin's deportees to Central Asia, from where they have since returned, claiming land and heritage in a densely populated area. Should real clashes occur, Kiev is likely to impose a state of emergency and send in troops, and the Russian irredentists could proclaim independence from Ukraine.

Given this mix, Georgia would be seen as a sideshow compared with what could happen in Ukraine. For those in the West who had long pushed for Ukraine's membership in NATO, Georgia offers a perfect argument in favor of putting Kiev on a fast track to join the alliance. They see a pro-Western Ukraine as an indispensable bulwark against a neo-imperial Russia. For the Kremlin, Georgia represents the danger of letting the United States use an unstable neighboring state in a proxy war to hurt and provoke Russia. Ukraine stands in the middle, and in addition to the intense domestic strife leading up the presidential elections, outside interference from both Russia and the West is a certainty.

This is a recipe for a crisis of European proportions. Yushchenko should not be allowed to play Russian roulette with his country, and sensible leaders in America, Europe, Russia and, of course, Ukraine need to agree on ways of keeping Ukraine united, and at peace. Georgia is a warning one can ill afford to ignore.

Trenin is a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of “Getting Russia Right” (Carnegie).

© 2008