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You also got a chance indirectly, through an Afghan you worked with, to interview some Taliban figures. What did they say?
The most telling aspect of our conversations through a third party with Taliban commanders is their understanding of time and space. These are very, very patient people. They recognize the odds are the Canadians will be leaving in 2011. Their recent operations against the French convoy and other international coalition members would suggest that a critical aspect of their strategy is trying to break up the international coalition. They recognize that some members like the United States might be around for the long haul but they were very clear they're willing to fight for the next 50 or 100 years and they recognize that most regimes in the West just don't have that staying power. The other thing that was quite clear from the Taliban commanders was their intimate knowledge of the needs, desires and customs and mores of the rural people they're dealing with. A counterinsurgency in many respects is an information war and their intimate knowledge at this level allows them to build information strategies that greatly outstrip ours and help to contribute to their strong position.

You believe that a surge in Afghanistan might actually be counterproductive. Why?
I think the influx of large numbers of troops isn't the solution. It's like I said earlier, I think we basically have a manpower distribution problem in Afghanistan. And in fact many of the rural Pashtuns that I spoke of continually talked about how new large bases that were established brought the Taliban into these areas. So there's one argument that can be made that more soldiers coming into the country will be [countered] by more Taliban insurgent fighters that can cause problems throughout the Pashtun society as well as Afghanistan in general. Remember, the Soviets had hundreds of thousands of troops in Afghanistan but they were basically distributed in the urban areas and they could not quell the mujahedin insurgency. If we're going to bring more troops into the country, hopefully we'll be able to have them located at the district level so that they can have more impact on the insurgents.

You spoke to village leaders and Afghan politicians. What were some of the issues they raised concerning the presence of American troops?
Well, it was almost [unanimous] in my conversations with Afghan politicians in the east of the country, especially in Kunar and Nangarhar: these gentlemen were complaining bitterly about what they call American night operations, where we will go into a village in the middle of the night and round up military-age people for interviews or actually take away mullahs that we suspect being involved in the insurgency. I had a very interesting conversation with Governor [Gul Agha] Surzai in Nangarhar who actually said to me, I think somewhat for effect, that he had threatened to resign in a conversation with President Karzai concerning these types of operations because they're counterproductive to all kinds of policies that they're trying to pursue at the provincial level to gain the trust and confidence of the villagers. When the Americans or the international forces come in and do snag-and-bag type operations such as this, it has a tendency to set back other types of initiatives that the provincial governments might be pursuing in these same village areas. So this is a very damning development that I heard constantly in my conversations with not only tribal leaders but politicians in the east of the country.

© 2008

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Member Comments

  • Posted By: jbz7879 @ 01/01/2009 12:28:11 PM

    what is wrong

    usa is getting its *** kicked
    lolz

    and so will obama as well
    and he is already has such a skinnny he will be kicked all the way to moon and michelle will have to go to retrieve him

    that is if he tries any silly tricks like bush -only decency begets decency -

    and american afghan policy is anything but decent

    no way is america getting any cake in afghanistan ,iran or pakistan and that is for sure
    inshallah

  • Posted By: aliyandilawar @ 10/16/2008 7:50:07 PM

    I absolutely agree with Thomas Johnson???s identification of flaws in the present US counter-terrorist strategy in Afghanistan. The security situation has alarmingly deteriorated in the country over the past couple of years and Taliban or anti government elements are much stronger today than they were previously. They are free to operate and coerce/intimidate the rural population in large areas of the country (perhaps more than the government and international forces can do it under the present arrangements). The record breaking bumper crops of opium in last two years right under the nose of 60,000 international troops and Afghan government (practically absent form rural areas) have, on one hand, fairly resolved the Taliban???s dilemma of disruption to their financial channels and on the other, seriously question the role of international forces while being in cities. With a total agreement to writer???s argument on dissimilarity of Iraq and Afghanistan, and my personal experience of the region, I think the conventional wisdom of transplanting strategy of Iraq along with General Patreus and his surge approach needs to be seriously revisited. Perhaps, US needs to make Karzai Government play a bigger role than they are playing at the moment along with de-garrisoning of international troops from cities and moving them to villages. Taking more Pushtoons (may be some moderate parts of Taliban and I guess moderates do exist) on board thorough negotiations and making a more wider-netted and harmonized government in Afghanistan may help restore the situation

  • Posted By: aliyandilawar @ 10/16/2008 7:47:34 PM

    I absolutely agree with Thomas Johnson???s identification of flaws in the present US counter-terrorist strategy in Afghanistan. The security situation has alarmingly deteriorated in the country over the past couple of years and Taliban or anti government elements are much stronger today than they were previously. They are free to operate and coerce/intimidate the rural population in large areas of the country (perhaps more than the government and international forces can do it under the present arrangements). The record breaking bumper crops of opium in last two years right under the nose of 60,000 international troops and Afghan government (practically absent form rural areas) have, on one hand, fairly resolved the Taliban???s dilemma of disruption to their financial channels and on the other, seriously question the role of international forces while being in cities. With a total agreement to writer???s argument on dissimilarity of Iraq and Afghanistan, and my personal experience of the region, I think the conventional wisdom of transplanting strategy of Iraq along with General Patreus and his surge approach needs to be seriously revisited. Perhaps, US needs to make Karzai Government play a bigger role than they are playing at the moment along with de-garrisoning of international troops from cities and moving them to villages. Taking more Pushtoons (may be some moderate parts of Taliban and I guess moderates do exist) on board thorough negotiations and making a more wider-netted and harmonized government in Afghanistan may help restore the situation

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