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Taylor
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Paulson's Panic
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Paulson argues that relieving banks of dubious mortgage-backed securities will "unclog" the financial system and encourage essential business and consumer lending. Maybe. It's true that these securities, because they cannot easily be valued, have created immense uncertainty. Banks and other financial institutions reduced routine lending to each other; everyone worried that the other bank might be in trouble. Having the Treasury buy these mortgage securities, on which losses have already been booked, might minimize these fears.
The trouble is that fears extend beyond mortgage securities. It wasn't just home mortgages that were bundled up into bonds and sold to institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, college endowments). Auto loans, credit card debt and commercial real estate loans have been similarly packaged, $900 billion worth in 2007. Naturally, doubts about the value of these securities have also increased. "Securitization" may survive, but this lending is already down (80 percent in 2008), reports Thomson Reuters. Credit is tightening across the board; issuance of high-quality corporate bonds is down 22 percent, while riskier "high yield" bonds are down 65 percent.
What we are discovering is that all the complex securities, combined with ever-greater international investment flows, have created a global financial system "so arcane that few people can understand its workings," David Smick writes in "The World Is Curved: Hidden Dangers to the Global Economy." The difference between now and two years ago is that financial managers then thought they understood the system; now they know they don't. Ignorance breeds risk-aversion and fear.
Like wage-price controls, Paulson's plan is no panacea. Banks, hedge funds, private equity funds and others are trying to reduce risk by "deleveraging"—selling stocks and bonds to raise cash, increase capital and cut their own debt. The rush to cash is a hallmark of financial crises. But what makes sense for one may be ruinous for all. Heavy selling depresses prices; lower prices then increase losses, deplete capital, prompt more selling and heighten fear. At best, Paulson's plan might preempt this spiral by allowing investors to unload their least attractive securities.
But it wouldn't automatically stimulate new lending, revitalize "securitization" or prevent more "deleveraging." Time is needed. The rescue is being constructed so hastily that it may include all manner of flawed provisions: too much power for the Treasury secretary; authority for bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages. Congress faces a wrenching dilemma, imposed on it by financial markets and Paulson. If it dawdles, it may invite the panic that Paulson has brazenly predicted. But if it acts too quickly, it may create a monster whose full implications emerge only with time.
© 2008
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