What this article does not mention is the nature of the "real" problem with credit default swaps. Why are they ???weapons of mass destruction????
As long as they were used to cover the risk of loan defaults, then all was well. But as with many other good things, more was viewed as better.
What happened was that Credit Default Swaps were being sold to people that had not made a loan to anyone and had nothing at risk. These CDSs were based on a "reference" security. This meant that A could make a bet with B that C would default on his loan from D. These became so popular that the ???insured??? value of the CDSs exceeded the total amount actually at risk by many times. The amounts are in the trillions of dollars. There may not be enough money in the world to pay off the entire potential liability.
This practice is exactly like taking out fire insurance on your neighbor???s house. But you can only benefit if your neighbor's house burns down.
If you were an unscrupulous person and you had insured your neighbor???s house, wouldn???t you be tempted to help things along? What if you had insured a hundred houses? Would you just sit back and hope or would you attempt to improve the chances of collecting? Would you would run for local government and use your position to gut the fire department or change the building codes and then insure the new homes that were built to the lower standards.
This is exactly what has happened. The government mandated lending to people who couldn???t repay the loans. These loans became the basis for the ???reference securities??? on which people made huge bets. Every CDS that was written against a reference security was in fact a bet that that security would go into default. The government actively prevented state governments from regulating these bets or the risky loans. As a result, someone has gained trillions of dollars by draining the coffers of the organizations that sold the CDSs and then of the Federal Government.
So who are these people? Who has gained the most from the massive defaults in mortgage loans? Who were the parties that purchased these CDSs but had nothing at risk? Who was the beneficiary of the Federal Government???s gutting of the figurative ???Wall Street fire department????
AIG, the 18th largest company in the world, was given $150B of public money to keep it solvent. Most of that went to pay of CDS liabilities. This is just one company of many.
It would not surprise me one bit to discover that the people involved in setting up the scenario, that allowed CDSs and subprime mortgages to both remain unregulated, are intimately connected with the people who benefited from the firestorm that has swept through the financial system of the US and the world. Unfortunately we must rely on the shallow reporting of corporate owned news organizations to get the facts into the open.
The Monster That Ate Wall Street
How 'credit default swaps'—an insurance against bad loans—turned from a smart bet into a killer.
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What About Us?
Wall Street's problems have captured the attention of Congress, the White House and the media. But on the country's Main Streets, worried workers, struggling small business owners and cash-strapped families are wondering if anyone is paying attention to them. A look at how Americans are coping with the economic crisis.
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They're called "Off-Site Weekends"—rituals of the high-finance world in which teams of bankers gather someplace sunny to blow off steam and celebrate their successes as Masters of the Universe. Think yacht parties, bikini models, $1,000 bottles of Cristal. One 1994 trip by a group of JPMorgan bankers to the tony Boca Raton Resort & Club in Florida has become the stuff of Wall Street legend—though not for the raucous partying (although there was plenty of that, too). Holed up for most of the weekend in a conference room at the pink, Spanish-style resort, the JPMorgan bankers were trying to get their heads around a question as old as banking itself: how do you mitigate your risk when you loan money to someone? By the mid-'90s, JPMorgan's books were loaded with tens of billions of dollars in loans to corporations and foreign governments, and by federal law it had to keep huge amounts of capital in reserve in case any of them went bad. But what if JPMorgan could create a device that would protect it if those loans defaulted, and free up that capital?
What the bankers hit on was a sort of insurance policy: a third party would assume the risk of the debt going sour, and in exchange would receive regular payments from the bank, similar to insurance premiums. JPMorgan would then get to remove the risk from its books and free up the reserves. The scheme was called a "credit default swap," and it was a twist on something bankers had been doing for a while to hedge against fluctuations in interest rates and commodity prices. While the concept had been floating around the markets for a couple of years, JPMorgan was the first bank to make a big bet on credit default swaps. It built up a "swaps" desk in the mid-'90s and hired young math and science grads from schools like MIT and Cambridge to create a market for the complex instruments. Within a few years, the credit default swap (CDS) became the hot financial instrument, the safest way to parse out risk while maintaining a steady return. "I've known people who worked on the Manhattan Project," says Mark Brickell, who at the time was a 40-year-old managing director at JPMorgan. "And for those of us on that trip, there was the same kind of feeling of being present at the creation of something incredibly important."
Like Robert Oppenheimer and his team of nuclear physicists in the 1940s, Brickell and his JPMorgan colleagues didn't realize they were creating a monster. Today, the economy is teetering and Wall Street is in ruins, thanks in no small part to the beast they unleashed 14 years ago. The country's biggest insurance company, AIG, had to be bailed out by American taxpayers after it defaulted on $14 billion worth of credit default swaps it had made to investment banks, insurance companies and scores of other entities. So much of what's gone wrong with the financial system in the past year can be traced back to credit default swaps, which ballooned into a $62 trillion market before ratcheting down to $55 trillion last week—nearly four times the value of all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange. There's a reason Warren Buffett called these instruments "financial weapons of mass destruction." Since credit default swaps are privately negotiated contracts between two parties and aren't regulated by the government, there's no central reporting mechanism to determine their value. That has clouded up the markets with billions of dollars' worth of opaque "dark matter," as some economists like to say. Like rogue nukes, they've proliferated around the world and now lie hiding, waiting to blow up the balance sheets of countless other financial institutions.
It didn't start out that way. One of the earliest CDS deals came out of JPMorgan in December 1997, when the firm put into place the idea hatched in Boca Raton. It essentially took 300 different loans, totaling $9.7 billion, that had been made to a variety of big companies like Ford, Wal-Mart and IBM, and cut them up into pieces known as "tranches" (that's French for "slices"). The bank then identified the riskiest 10 percent tranche and sold it to investors in what was called the Broad Index Securitized Trust Offering, or Bistro for short. The Bistro was put together by Terri Duhon, at the time a 25-year-old MIT graduate working on JPMorgan's credit swaps desk in New York—a division that would eventually earn the name the Morgan Mafia for the number of former members who went on to senior positions at global banks and hedge funds. "We made it possible for banks to get their credit risk off their books and into nonfinancial institutions like insurance companies and pension funds," says Duhon, who now heads her own derivatives consulting business in London.
Before long, credit default swaps were being used to encourage investors to buy into risky emerging markets such as Latin America and Russia by insuring the debt of developing countries. Later, after corporate blowouts like Enron and WorldCom, it became clear there was a big need for protection against company implosions, and credit default swaps proved just the tool. By then, the CDS market was more than doubling every year, surpassing $100 billion in 2000 and totaling $6.4 trillion by 2004.
And then came the housing boom. As the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and Americans started buying homes in record numbers, mortgage-backed securities became the hot new investment. Mortgages were pooled together, and sliced and diced into bonds that were bought by just about every financial institution imaginable: investment banks, commercial banks, hedge funds, pension funds. For many of those mortgage-backed securities, credit default swaps were taken out to protect against default. "These structures were such a great deal, everyone and their dog decided to jump in, which led to massive growth in the CDS market," says Rohan Douglas, who ran Salomon Brothers and Citigroup's global credit swaps research division through the 1990s.
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