India’s Terrorist Problem

It is time for the Bush administration to turn the screws. Since 2001 the United States has given Pakistan $8.3 billion in aid, earmarked for specific military and economic purposes. Washington also doles out $700 million a year in "Coalition Support Funds," unmonitored cash subsidies to Pakistan's armed forces. This largesse is supposedly to reimburse the Pakistanis for their expenses in fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But a U.S. General Accounting Office investigation found that "neither the Defense Department nor we could determine how much of the costs reimbursed were actually incurred."

Washington should stop throwing good money after bad. All future aid to Pakistan should be conditioned on wide-ranging cooperation in counterterrorism. This means purging the ISI of Islamists once and for all, starting with those known by U.S. intelligence to support the Taliban. It means stopping radical madrassas, like the Jamia Binoria in Karachi, from training jihadists. And above all, it means cracking down on Islamist groups that are not only a threat to Pakistan itself but are also helping terrorists in India. The United States should insist that Pakistan share intelligence relating to the cross-border activities of these groups in India and should press for the extradition of suspects, like Dawood Ibrahim, wanted by Indian authorities.

In seeking to combat Al Qaeda and the Islamist threat to Pakistan, the United States need not and should not undermine its friendship with an increasingly powerful India. After all, New Delhi will remain vital to Washington's interests long after Osama bin Laden has been forgotten.

Harrison is director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy and a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

© 2008