Why the Election Mattered

The 2008 Presidential election will have a major impact on U.S. foreign policy—but not for the reasons many think.

Whichever side one listened to during the campaign, the policy differences between Barack Obama and John McCain were said to be stark. McCain would pursue victory in Iraq; Obama would bring the troops home. McCain would push free trade; Obama would restrict it. McCain was a hawk who would take on a world full of evildoers; Obama was a talker rather than a fighter who would restore diplomacy to its pride of place.

Most of this, of course, was bunk. Campaign discussions take place in a mythical world where issues are simple and ideological, and there are clear right and wrong answers. The invocation of those answers by candidates is a political act rather than an intellectual one, designed to accentuate or blur differences between them to curry favor with key constituencies at key moments. In the real world, by contrast, foreign-policy issues are complex and practical, with only bad and worse answers—all of which usually involve unpleasant trade-offs and inevitable disappointments. So as a rule, campaign rhetoric is a lousy guide to post-election policy, and this cycle is unlikely to be an exception.

In truth, moreover, there are no longer many great debates about the basic course of Washington's relations with the world. The Obama administration, like its predecessors, will try to maintain Great Power peace and a liberal trading system while spreading freedom abroad at the margins—where it is not too difficult or costly. It will use both unilateral and multilateral action as seems appropriate. It will neither rule the world with an iron fist nor retreat into isolation but will engage reluctantly, pulled away from domestic issues by shifting perceptions of external threat or opportunity. Under Obama, most U.S. policies toward most issues will remain essentially unchanged—as they would have no matter who was elected in November.

So why, then—beyond its obvious symbolism and initial burst of foreign good will—will Obama's election have a major impact? Because the world today is full of serious and complicated challenges that call for sophisticated adult management by the world's hegemon—something an Obama administration is likely to provide and that McCain's wouldn't have.

The hallmark of George W. Bush's presidency, particularly in its early years, was disdain for technocratic competence and prudence. Whether because of politics or ideology or mere incuriosity, little attention was paid to conventional professional expertise. As the disillusioned social scientist John DiIulio, brought in to help run the new administration's Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, put it early on, "there is no precedent in any modern White House for what is going on in this one: a complete lack of a policy apparatus … The lack of even basic policy knowledge, and the only casual interest in knowing more, was somewhat breathtaking." DiIulio was referring to domestic policy, but the same attitude applied to foreign and security policy as well, typified by the still-baffling failure to plan seriously for handling Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. In the end, Bush's many failures were due more to amateurism and irresponsibility than to substantive policy choices.

A McCain administration might have displayed some similar characteristics. John McCain has an impressive record as a legislator, but he ran for president on biography and character, not policy. From his selection of an inexperienced and intellectually undistinguished running mate, to his stumbling response to the financial crisis, to his hoary political attacks, McCain's campaign decisions did not inspire confidence in his future governance. McCain saw every problem as a morality play with himself as the hero, betraying annoyance at hints of complexity and nuance.