Bring In the Diplomats

It is more a question of when than if there will be another ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Even as fighting raged late last week, the outlines of one were clear. Hamas will agree to stop firing rockets into Israel; the Israelis will pull back their forces from Gaza. New measures will slow but not stop the smuggling of arms from Egypt into Gaza.

What will Israel have accomplished then? It will have demonstrated that Hamas cannot shell Israeli territory with impunity, and that Israel is not bound by rules of proportionality. Hamas will be weaker militarily. Several leaders have been killed along with a large number of fighters, and its ability to produce and launch rockets is diminished. In the process, Israel's armed forces have restored some of their reputation, which had lost considerable luster after the unsuccessful campaign against Hizbullah in 2006. Iran, the principal patron of both Hamas and Hizbullah and the greatest regional threat to Israel, may no longer think Israel is a helpless giant.

But attacking Hamas has had the contradictory effect of strengthening its reputation as the main arm of Palestinian resistance. And images of what Israeli weapons in some instances did to innocent Palestinians has forfeited sympathy for Israel and made it more difficult for moderate Arab governments to normalize relations with the country. A ceasefire will prove to be little more than a break between rounds of warfare if something is not done to change the dynamics between Israel and its neighbors.

Northern Ireland is relevant here. Peace was made there only after many years and after the British Army convinced the Irish Republican Army that it could not shoot its way into power. But just as important were British diplomats, who made it clear that minority Catholics could get a fair deal if they renounced violence and embraced politics. Indeed, while they did not get all they wanted, they got a great deal more than they had.

All of which leads to President Obama and the new U.S. administration. Every crisis holds within it the seeds of opportunity, and this one is no exception. But to take advantage of it, Washington must give Palestinians a reason for choosing talks over terror. The only way to do this is to demonstrate that talking—negotiating—will deliver more than fighting.

Sooner rather than later the new president should publicly articulate the contours of what the United States believes would constitute a just settlement of the Middle East conflict. This means calling for the establishment of a viable Palestinian state based on 1967 lines, with territorial compensation for those borders altered to take into account Israel's large settlement blocs and legitimate security requirements. Palestinian refugees would receive financial compensation and the right to settle in the new country of Palestine but, with few exceptions, not in Israel. Palestinians would enjoy some foothold in Greater Jerusalem (so that they could claim it as their capital) and authority over Muslim holy places.