Mr khilnaani you appear to be from sind the part that belongs now to pakistan. Your subliminal message is but only an extention of your foriegn policy and for this your Indian pay masters have very ably guided and nuttured you. First then you must stop trying to destabilize Pakistan you havee about a dozen consulates spannining the rim line along Pkaistans border and from which your intelligence RAW is fanning all the trouble. Next under the cloak of Talibans you are sending the purchased pashtuns after necessary training to fight and keep Pakistan army busy. Rs 10000/00 per fighter is a lot of attraction. Your proxy - mullah Fazal ullah brain washes adolascent young fellows to martyr themselves for the glory of Islam. Little do they realise that their mentor is paid a heavy sum for each suicide bombing. These poor guys are heavily drugged in the terminal phases of their mission- which is akin to what was practiced by hasan bi sabah - centuries ago and who in the dictionary is known as" tha old man of the mountains". Very innocently the writer has chosen to ignore the "hindu fundlementalism" gaining grounds in India with considerable speed. He has also chosen to ignore thirteen odd seperatist movements spawning the lenght and breath of Indiia. Most significant being the Kashmir movement. They do not want to be with India. It is India trend setter to terrorism. Remember 1971 when you for the first time introduced terrorism in this region.- by training and arming the mukti bhanis or the bangladesh fighters to carry out terror activities in Pakistan. You have - in collobration with Israel- the kosher-trying to control the Kahmiris and terror operations in our Baluchistan and Swat - malakund -Bajaur areas! How come most pakistanis view that Mumbai was a project of RAW-Mossad - Modi combined and not that of Pakistan. The same is true of Attack on SriLankan taem in Lahore. Do not qoute our president because he thrives on the bandwagon of CIA!!
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The Revenge Of The Near
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Another urgent step has barely been discussed: the need to ensure that the motivating rage of the Pakistani attackers does not come to be widely shared by India's own Muslims. This won't be easy, for India's Muslims have reason to feel aggrieved. The terrorists at the Taj claimed to be motivated by Kashmir and the government-linked violence against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, when several thousand died. More than six years later, the perpetrators still roam free; many of the accused even hold office. This has weakened Muslims' faith in India's commitment to the rule of law. Addressing these flash points quickly is crucial.
But addressing symbolic wrongs won't be enough. As a government commission documented in 2006, the conditions of India's Muslims are dire. Although they represent 13.4 percent of the population, they make up only 4 percent of its undergraduates, 5 percent of government employees and 7 percent of legislators. Nearly 40 percent of urban Muslims live in poverty, a larger number than even the worst-off Hindu castes. Improving their prospects must begin with early intervention: helping more Muslim children, especially girls, attend school. And it must extend to policies that seek to link them to India's growing economy—by granting them easier access to credit, for example.
Yet even if India were able to resolve these internal issues, it's still unlikely terrorism would cease. That's because India's largest problem lies just beyond its threshold—in Pakistan.
Pakistan today vexes much of the world, but it most endangers both India's immediate security and its future development. To many of Pakistan's radicals, India is even more threatening than America, the Great Satan. India is democratic, secular, culturally similar to Pakistan—and right next door. It is also an easier target than the United States.
Despite these many dangers, so far India has refused to respond to 11/26 with a wave of militarism—another contrast with America after 9/11. While the Indian home minister has given Islamabad and Washington a dossier cataloging Pakistani links to the attackers, the war spirit in India has thus far been relatively muted. This speaks less to India's national temperament than to a paucity of options. Indians are generally unwilling to address the problem of Pakistan head on, preferring to leave their nemesis to its chief paymaster and handler, Washington. This approach has generally suited the United States, since it has a major stake in restraining India's responses.
Indian diplomats have tried to mobilize international pressure on Pakistan and asked for the extradition of 20 suspects. Yet more than two months after the attacks, these efforts have produced little. Still, there's plenty more India could and should do; it has far more options besides all-out military action or the continuation of a rather fruitless dialogue with successive Pakistani governments. India needs to develop a richer repertoire of policies. And building that repertoire must start from the premise that it is increasingly implausible to treat Pakistan as a sovereign state. If there ever was such a unified entity, it no longer exists. Pakistan is in multiple wars with itself, fractured between its civilian government, its powerful military, the intelligence services and a proliferating array of armed extremist groups.
Pakistan's leaders have thrived by two basic tactics: threatening that all will go to the dogs if they are ousted (Musharraf reaped rich rewards from the United States with this line) and pleading that the government is new and fragile and must be given a chance to get on course (the current line of President Asif Ali Zardari). But in more than 60 years, Pakistan has never been able to establish a normal pattern of governance or to assert sovereignty over its own territory. India's most urgent task will thus be to minimize the degree to which Pakistan can pose threats—to its neighbors, to Europe and the United States and, finally, to itself. That will require India to work more assertively with the West, and to work both with and—where necessary—against Pakistan. It will also require the United States to pay greater heed to India's interests. Investing in the fragile Zardari regime is probably futile. The military dominates Pakistan, and it is the generals whom India must convince to stop supporting terrorism.
Compared with the United States after 9/11, India has reacted to the Mumbai attacks with restraint. But if 11/26 inspires reform only to India's security infrastructure, an important lesson will have been missed. The siege of Mumbai revealed serious deficits in India's political judgment—in the nation's treatment of its Muslims and its relations with the region. If India hopes to protect itself in the days ahead and to continue its economic ascent, a stiff dose of realism will be needed. Succeeding in a globalized world is a lofty aspiration. But India still lives in the gritty here and now, a fact its governments and citizens cannot wish away.
Khilnani is the author of “The Idea of India” and director of South Asian studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
© 2009
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