Sarkozy of Arabia

Rarely have real-estate taxes revealed so much about realpolitik as in a law passed earlier this year by the French parliament. Its purpose was to create special tax exemptions for the emirs and emissaries of the rich little Gulf emirate of Qatar on the magnificent mansions they've acquired in the heart of Paris. Lest any legislator miss the reasoning behind this sweetheart deal, an appendix to the bill waxed eloquent about the "very strong" and "privileged" relations between France and Qatar, based on "the wish of the Qataris to diversify their alliances and their partnerships so as not to depend exclusively on the United States."

There is a weird echo in that wording. French President Nicolas Sarkozy presents himself as America's best friend on the continent, but that kind of solicitude to the oil-rich Arab states of the Gulf was a trademark of his predecessor, Jacques Chirac. Determined to stand up to the American "hyperpower," Chirac pitched France to the kings and emirs as an alternative ally for their portfolio of protectors: the Un-America, if you will. So too, Sarkozy, and there is a similar Chiraquien smell about the commercial ambitions linked to France's Gulf initiatives. Sarkozy unabashedly hopes to sell Airbuses, fighter planes and nuclear reactors to some of the few countries that can still afford them.

Yet Sarkozy differs from Chirac in at least one important respect: while Chirac's stand against the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq turned into a diplomatic confrontation, Sarkozy's policy is to complement American policy in the region—especially when it seems to be stalled. He has worked closely with the United States to help isolate Iran because of its nuclear program, while being the vanguard in efforts to improve relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who's shown signs he wants to come in from the cold. Sarkozy also teamed up with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to try to hammer out the ceasefire in Gaza in January. And a new French military base in Abu Dhabi, due to open as early as next month, may help facilitate NATO's expanding operations in Afghanistan.

Still, commercial interests are never far from his agenda. In February, Sarkozy became the first French president to visit Baghdad. With security improving there, the old cry of "stop the war" has given way to "let's make a deal." One of the big projects the French want is the potential multibillion-dollar makeover of the Baghdad airport.

Washington can hardly object. In the twilight years of the Bush presidency there was a realization that the United States had to work with its allies, not just dictate terms to them. And the many old pros in the Obama administration know that the price for strategic cooperation is also a degree of competition for commerce and influence—as long as everyone is moving in the same direction. For the moment, that seems to be the case. Indeed, a certain symbiotic division of labor has taken shape: the United States charting the course and France scouting the route.

One other reason for this changing dynamic is that while the U.S. has a long, almost unassailable relationship with the richest and most powerful of Gulf monarchies, the House of Saud, the French have for decades cultivated ties to the ruling family of Qatar. Those links became especially close after Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani came to power in the bloodless coup that ousted his father in 1995. Ever since, the peninsula's huge reserves of natural gas have given its native population of a few hundred thousand people the highest per capita income in the world and the country has gone on a spending spree. It has purchased 80 percent of its military equipment from France, which also helps to train its security forces. (That's the kind of relationship that tends to endure in these parts.) Paris is also due to open a branch of the famous Saint-Cyr military academy in Doha. For good measure, there's a lycée français in the works to be named after Voltaire, whose ideas about social reform and sex would seem an odd match for the local Wahhabi culture.

The links have paid off. By working closely with the Qataris, Sarkozy managed to stage one of his first big diplomatic triumphs only weeks after his election: the liberation of Bulgarian nurses who had been held for years in prison by Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi on trumped-up charges of spreading AIDS. Kaddafi was demanding an upfront payoff of some $460 million. Neither France nor the European Union would agree to what smacked of blackmail, but few players in the Middle East are as skilled as the Qataris when it comes to operating in the gray areas of secret favors. Qatar conveniently put up the money, and the nurses were freed. (As the official justification for the recent French tax law put it, Qatar "played a role that was discreet but without a doubt decisive" in that case.)