Defining Victory Down

President Barack Obama's decision to send 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan will push the United States deeper into a quagmire, since the mission is undefined, the U.S. economy is spiraling downward and America's NATO allies won't send more combat forces. Moreover, the proposition that more firepower will roll back the Taliban is dubious. There will be 60,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by year's end, and even with help from the Afghan National Army and the International Security Force—most of whose members are not engaged in fighting—that is not enough to cover a nation of 33 million people, spread out over 647,500 square kilometers. At the post-surge peak in Iraq, there were 140,000 U.S. troops trying to secure a smaller population of 28 million, in an area only two thirds as large. In Kosovo, the multinational coalition numbered 50,000 at its height; Afghanistan's population is 16 times bigger and its area is 60 times larger.

The force-to-space ratio problem is so skewed that the generals will surely call for more troops to combat an insurgency that is active in almost every part of Afghanistan and, unlike its Iraqi counterpart, has sanctuaries and collaborators next door.

Moreover, stepping up ground operations and airstrikes will inevitably kill more Afghan civilians. That will increase Afghans' substantial outrage and benefit the Taliban, despite its policy of deliberately staging attacks designed to increase civilian casualties. Hitting sanctuaries of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan with UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) will also further enrage Pakistanis, who see such attacks as a violation of their sovereignty and likely to strengthen extremists.

What's needed, as President Obama himself has noted, is a political settlement. Here is a six-part plan he should consider.

* Announce that Washington does not seek permanent bases in Afghanistan and will depart in stages once there is a negotiated settlement. This declaration would counter the Taliban's claims that the United States wants to occupy Afghanistan long-term.

* Offer the Taliban a ceasefire, on a reciprocal basis. Though the insurgents now operate in 70 percent of Afghanistan and control significant territory, they have also taken heavy losses and may welcome a chance to participate in a political settlement. The Taliban is a diverse and decentralized assemblage, and the best way to identify "moderate" elements is by offering talks.

* Propose that the ceasefire be used to convene a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) of Afghan notables from all regions and ethnic groups and an array of professions—including those Taliban members who accept the ceasefire. The assembly should aim to reform the dysfunctional political system in ways that empower outlying areas, re-creating the traditional pattern of Afghan politics, the only one that has worked.

* Involve regional powers in the quest for a political solution. All of Afghanistan's neighbors have a real interest in a durable settlement. Iran, which does not want a Sunni fundamentalist government next door, was the Taliban's sworn enemy when it ruled Afghanistan. While Russia opposes U.S. bases in Central Asia, it fears that Islamic radicalism from Afghanistan and Pakistan could spill over its borders. China has similar fears. And while Pakistan's armed forces and intelligence services were once the Taliban's sponsors, they are coming to realize that they created a monster that could consume them. India's already significant exposure to terrorism will increase if fundamentalists and terrorists control Afghanistan and Pakistan.