A Highly Logical Approach

Several of the folks around you have said that the situation with Senator Daschle [the former senate democratic leader who had to withdraw his nomination for secretary of health and human services because of a tax issue] early on was a learning experience for you. what was the lesson of that?
Well, you know, Tom is a close friend and, I believe, an outstanding public servant—somebody who I think would have served wonderfully as HHS secretary … There was a unique mix of talents that he possessed: understanding the Senate, understanding how Congress worked and being deeply passionate about health care.

What I realized, though, is that if we're going to set a higher bar on transparency, openness, ethics, then we have to apply it even when it's inconvenient, and that means we have to work harder and smarter. And I'm sorry that I did not face up to that realization earlier so that Tom wasn't put in the position that he was in.

An adviser of yours told us that you quickly came to realize that you had obtained the largest megaphone in the world. Has there been a moment when you've said something or mused out loud in a way that a senator or even a candidate could have done, but a president can't do?
You know, precisely because I realized it pretty quickly, I think that I've been fairly careful about how you use the microphone. I'm sure I have made remarks that, in retrospect, I would have polished up a little bit more, and I'm sure that there's more to come on the gaffe front.

But one of the things I've actually been encouraged by—and I learned during the campaign—was the American people, I think, not only have a toleration but also a hunger for explanation and complexity, and a willingness to acknowledge hard problems. I think one of the biggest mistakes that is made in Washington is this notion you have to dumb things down for the public. I've always been struck by the fact that, if you can get me in a room with a group of people, even who disagree with me violently on an issue, they'll still take the time to listen. They might not, at the end of it, agree with me, but having seen how I'm thinking about a problem, having a sense of how I'm making decisions, that I understand their point of view, that I can actually make their argument for them, and that that's part of the decision-making process, it gives them a sense, at least, that they've been heard, and I think clarifies—well, it pushes us away from the dogmas and caricatures that I think get in the way of good policymaking and a more civil tone in our politics.

What have you learned watching the Republican party the past 115 days or so?
What I've learned, I think, [is] that the Republican Party, like the Democratic Party after Ronald Reagan's election, when it's been in power for a long time, has trouble making an adjustment—not just to minority status but also to self-reflection. I think there's a certain period of time where you insist on talking only to your base instead of to the American people more broadly. And I suspect that they'll make an adjustment. There are some smart people over there and some good people who may disagree with me on specific policies but I think have sincere convictions and want to see the country succeed.

Right now they're sort of trapped in the pattern of having to appeal to the most ideologically pure wing of their party as opposed to thinking a little bit more practically. And that, I think, is putting a lot of Republicans who would like to work with us on specific, select issues—they might disagree with us on one thing but want to work with us on another thing—in an awkward position.

If you start marginalizing too many of those people, sooner or later the party starts figuring out, "Well, you know what, this is probably not going to work for us long term," and the adjustment is made. But it's a painful process. As I said, the Democrats went through it, and I expect the Republicans will get through it as well.

What's your reaction to Vice President Cheney's ongoing [criticism]? He's not quite twittering your administration [ laughter ] but he's coming fairly close.
You know, Dick Cheney had a strong perspective about national security. It was tested in the early years of the Bush administration, and I think it resulted in a series of very bad decisions. I think what's interesting is that, in some ways, Dick Cheney actually lost these arguments inside the Bush administration.

And so he may have won early with Colin Powell and Condi Rice, but over the last two or three years of the Bush administration, I think there was a recognition among Republicans and Bush administration officials that these enhanced interrogation techniques that were being applied—that they had applied early on—were potentially counterproductive; that a posture of never talking to our enemies, of unilateral action, of framing national security only in terms of the application of force, often unilateral—that that wasn't producing.

And so it's interesting to me to see the vice president spending so much time trying to vindicate himself and relitigate the last eight years when, as I said, I think, actually, a lot of these arguments were settled even before we took over the White House.