Anyone but Ahmadinejad

Mousavi has had his own bumpy history with the Supreme Leader. The two men were thrown together after terrorists bombed the Islamic Republic Party's offices in August 1981. More than 60 people died in the blast, including the chief justice, the prime minister and the president. In the aftermath, Khamenei became president, and Mousavi was chosen as prime minister.

Khamenei took issue with Mousavi's leftist ideology, and he tried hard to get Parliament to name someone else as prime minister. It was no use; the Islamic Revolution's leader had let it be known that he liked Mousavi. "Imam Khomeini's support was crucial for Mousavi," says the candidate's campaign co-chair, Mohsen Aminzadeh. "I don't think he would have survived if the imam had not supported him." For the next eight years the friction with Khamenei only grew. Their inevitable turf battles were worsened by their conflicting personalities and ideologies and their rivalry for Khomeini's approval. "Imam Khomeini was really clever," says a former minister in the Mousavi government, unwilling to be named saying anything impolitic. "He never allowed one group to have the upper hand in the country. Whenever one group was getting too proud, he would lend his support to the other group."

Mousavi often seemed to have the advantage. He kept the economy directly and firmly under almost Soviet-style government control from the day he took office until the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988. Essential goods were rationed, industries were nationalized and the government put draconian restraints on imports and exports. But when Khomeini died, Khamenei became Supreme Leader. The Constitution was soon revised to abolish the post of prime minister, and Mousavi quietly returned to his easel, his drafting table and the boards of various art councils. "He was really tired," says Aminzadeh. "He didn't even want to talk politics." Until, that is, he declared for the presidency in March.

Most Iranian political observers believe Khamenei's first preference is a second term for Ahmadinejad. Still, the Supreme Leader likes to hedge his bets; if a challenger should come from behind and take the race, Mousavi may be the best in the field as far as Khamenei is concerned, despite their past disputes. "Mousavi is a real believer in the holiness of the Islamic Republic system," says the historian Mozafar. "You can call it his weakness or strength. But he believes that this system is a sacred phenomenon that should be protected by any means necessary." In early May, Khamenei paid a call at Mousavi's home to see the candidate's aging, infirm father. The visit was widely interpreted as a signal that Khamenei is prepared to live with a Mousavi victory if it comes to that.

Mousavi has relied heavily on such wink-and-nod endorsements. His campaign has paid special attention to winning friends among the leaders of Friday prayer services, says Hossein Sharifzadegan, Mousavi's brother-in-law: "In Iran you can really affect how the population votes through these meetings." Such old-style tactics only confirm the suspicions of people who already doubted Mousavi's reformist credentials. "He is not a modern candidate," says Abbas Abdi, a prominent reformist who supports another contender, Mehdi Karrubi. "A modern candidate actively goes after the popular vote. But Mr. Mousavi is waiting for the presidency on a silver plate."

Two months later, Mousavi's platform largely remains an open question. He calls himself a "reformist principalist"—a phrase that sounds just as vacuous in Farsi as in English. The term "principalist" is Iranian political jargon for the conservatives who support Khamenei and want to preserve the power of the Supreme Leader. They fall into two basic camps. There are hardliners who want to bring back the old revolutionary values; Ahmadinejad claims to be among them. And then there are the "logical principalists," who deplore Ahmadinejad's policies and insist the Islamic regime can survive only by modernizing. Mousavi is out to gain the votes of this second faction while remaining the main candidate of the reformists. It's an almost impossible straddle. But that may be the only way he can win.

Mousavi's backers argue that he can deliver what Iran needs most now: a government that can mend the damage caused by an irrational Ahmadinejad. "For sure I'm going to have some differences with President Mousavi," says Aminzadeh. "But what I'm certain of is that his government is going to be a logical one. Based on three decades of friendship with Mousavi, I know that he—unlike Ahmadinejad, who doesn't respect anyone else's opinion except his own—is going to consult with others before making a decision."

Many of Iran's young reformists want action, not compromise. Ex-president Khatami is begging them to be more realistic. "I'm sure those young people in Milad Hall who were chanting idealistic slogans know in their heart of hearts that those ideals are not realizable at the moment," says Khatami. The rally, billed as "the meeting of supporters of Khatami to support Mousavi," was their first public appearance together since Mousavi declared his candidacy. "We all would have preferred someone younger to be the reformist candidate," Khatami confesses. "But in the absence of that person, Mr. Mousavi is the best candidate. He can prepare an environment in which people like us can act as reformers."