Clues From Flight 447

maximum normal requirement 146.76. 0.323333333333333333333333333333333
611.855670103092783505154639175258~116.917333333333333333333333332113
@ 57 feet 1.92 inches vertical stabilizer setting basic setting actual setting 57 feet 1.43 inches
1.69207873369218137031292765258644
361.599999999999999999999999999966
57.8812348831249999999999999615625 feet horizontal stabilizer

Current indication is that the distance currently utilized of the vertical stabilizer on the existing plane is not correct, stress however on the pitot tubes is inherent however @ 4.162.

@ 50.8015 variance 54.96 @ 37.38
-2800
0.610847172599873845255358860632794
-0.347930984968499043269253709298568 ( horizontal stabilizer possibly commanding a drop) significant loss of lift
57.8675 feet @ 6870.60474417512026948522216059601 possible neutral laminants required
100.312026002166847237269772481006 approaching supersonic air rate however ratio may not be continued for elected for the fact that it might average too much weight anyways as above 940.46. This would cause the demand of the forward wings to lift and the weight of the air returning would be placed upon the vertical stabilizer which if exactly set and set by coordination of the other aspects of the design by their measurements @ 57 feet 1 inch would command the plane to degrade its altitude during its' flight path therefore utilization of said distance as in doubt from the formation of ice. 0.101465930917018765728542591602425 because it is actually requesting a new setting of 57 feet 1.41~(1.43 inches), avg 47 inches @ 6.35 ratio.
current set is 57 feet 1 inch 982.108715005567823237067599787867 a maximum 7.166-5 7.1035 363 (27) WARNING possible breakage of vibratory characterization present and located, would not proceed with the current horizontal stabilizer distance as such as needing additional lift and placement of a redundant system which alternates to during stormy weather, vibratory characteristics would attract ice formation and may interfere directly with the lift of the plane, recommended testing in wind tunnel with liquid O2 directly of the horizontal tail stabilizers. However alignments of electronic ice prevention boxes should be mounted within the wingsets and the vertical stabilizer preventing ice approaching and amassing toward the wings and the horizontal stabilizers and activated for use in bad weather. It is possible that a reduction of lift if sufficient ice is present and not being disbanded if approaching the stabilizer set.
if set at 57 feet 1.23 inches vertical stabilizer distance requested, ratio is 6.398 is additionally as requested and appears to be fully functional reasonable stability needs to be established if also wishing with an alternate set of horizontal stabilizers, liquid O2 ice testing also recommended, otherwise 57 feet 1.43 inches vertical stabilizer recommended.

maximum normal requirement
57.8812348831249999999999999615625 feet @ 55.19

Current indication is that the distance currently utilized on the existing plane is not correct stress however on the pitot tubes is inherent however @ 4.162.

@ 50.8015
57.8675 feet possible neutral laminants required

pardon the additional comment.

Just one more comment, thank you. If and when .41 cu feet is averaged against the sensors in a storm situation it could lead to the actual sensors themselves sustaining damage which is not repairable. So my idea is not to use the 41, or get some pitot tubes that can withstand that type of wind, or they will probably break again.

Certain Vertical Stabilizers have had to be thickened because they were too thin, this one may qualify for that. It is Just that I notice that the 57.931 feet is just a lot of weight already if set there to really be running without a metal vertical stabilizer, or at least one that has been thickened. If the plane is averaging weight pushed down by the weight of the horizontal stabilizers as this one appears to be doing it may be too much and it may be forming a different form of control factor on the plane as the weight would increase with the distance of the horizontal decrease in distance. If this is so a motion would be created which could detract insignificant amounts of mass from the wing in the storm which however insignificant would add up to a difficult issue. This is because that when the planes wings are under by 1.01 feet an additional .3 cu. feet would have to be understood from the standpoint of setting the tail exactly the storm would probably take about .70 cu. feet away from the wingset leaving approximately .41 cu feet difference. This means that the stability of the plane would be compromised in a shifting motion. Most of the sensor data returns through this area and if blocked could lead to sensor malfunction under high wind rate.

To avoid further complication place between 57.9595 and 58.02600541999999999999999999999 feet horizontal stabilizer.

A330s are equiped with a SATPHONE system. I found a reference to this in an accident report which involved an A330 from last year. Voice communication from AF447 to Air France maintanance seems very likely. I am surprised that this isn't getting more attention given the urgency to find the voice recorder. A link to the accident report is provided.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/AAIR/pdf/AO2008070_prelim.pdf

it does not look like the plane came down but vanished in thin air and sarkozy is least bothered to investigate it ,how can in the day when they monitor my telephone from space can a plane go missing without a trace is rather a very pathetic joke .

Perhaps, there was no communication between the flight, and the air traffic control authorities involved. Perhaps, the communication was not working, between the air traffic control authorities, and the flight.The plane has a glide path, when it descends. The pilot had ample time to convey an emergency. How all the modes of communication did not work, is a wonder. The aircraft seems to have sunk, because no debris was found. I say, "seems".

Various arguments have been presented as to why Air France 447 was lost at sea. These include structural breakup, computer failure, sabotage, electrical failure, and an electrical fire. What has not been put forth as a possible explanation is unstoppable blinding smoke in the cockpit. I???m not suggesting that smoke in the cockpit is the answer. I???m only advocating that it is a possibility, one not previously offered, and no less plausible an hypothesis than any other.

On average, there is one unscheduled or emergency landing in North America daily. Most aircraft land without incident. But In July 2007, a NASCAR corporate twin-engine aircraft crashed. It experienced a short circuit. The wire insulation burned and that led to a cry of ???smoke in the cockpit.??? The aircraft crashed two minutes later. A short circuit lead to the fire and smoke in the crash of Swissair 111. It???s crash, like the crash of ValuJet 592 that preceded it, began with the cry ???smoke in the cockpit.??? These three examples and many others can be found in a 16-page report listing aircraft in which smoke was a cause or a factor in aircraft incidents and accidents. (See: http://www.smokeinthecockpit.com/references/List-of-Some-Smoke-Related-Accidents.pdf )

Electrical failures can lead to blinding smoke in the cockpit. Contrary to a common perception, pilots cannot see when unstoppable blinding smoke enters the cockpit. Air France 447 signaled that it was loosing cabin pressure. When smoke invades the cockpit, the Federal Aviation Administration recommends that pilots depressurize the aircraft to force the smoke out. If the smoke were a one-time event, this procedure would likely work. However, when the smoke is continuous, depressurization cannot help. The pressure on the outside and inside of the cabin would be equalized. Continuous smoke would build up, blinding the pilots.

Let me reiterate. I am not stating that continuous blinding smoke brought down Air France flight 447. I am saying that continuous unstoppable blinding smoke in the cockpit is an equally worthy hypothesis to consider. For those interested in more information on the subject, you might want to read Air Safety Week???s overview of the unsafe condition of smoke in the cockpit: http://www.smokeinthecockpit.com/references/Air-Safety-Week-Smoke.pdf

You can also read a recent (May 21st) U.S. House of Representative amendment to the FAA Reauthorization Bill (http://www.smokeinthecockpit.com/references/GAO-Amendment.pdf) that requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study the unsafe condition of unstoppable blinding smoke in the cockpit. For an in-depth article on unstoppable blinding smoke in the cockpit, see ???
http://www.smokeinthecockpit.com/references/Blinding-Smoke.pdf

James Stevenson
Former Assistant Managing Editor
Air Safety Week