Iraq Steps Out of Iran’s Shadow

Tehran gave its full support to the camp's new occupants. Captured Iraqi Shia troops were allowed to join SCIRI's fighting ranks, rather than being tossed into a POW camp. While Dawa's influence dwindled, its run-ins with the Iranians continued. Hassan recounts how he went to renew his and Maliki's immigration cards, only to be told by an Iranian functionary that written approval from SCIRI was needed. One of the worst moments came when Saddam threatened airstrikes on Ahwaz. Townspeople were fleeing for their lives when Maliki knocked on Hassan's door and asked for his help; Maliki's wife had just delivered a son by Caesarean, and the hospital was being evacuated. The two men raced to carry her, her IV drip and the baby down the hospital steps to a car heading out of town—with no help from the Iranians. "They didn't care about us," Hassan says.

Acquaintances say Maliki was anything but sorry to leave Iran when he moved to Syria. (Sources differ on the date, but his official biography says it was in 1990.) His Farsi is even worse than his English, according to friends. "You can only learn a language if you love the people," Shami remarks. All the same, Maliki and other Shia leaders in Iraq have not forgotten that Iran was the first neighbor to recognize the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi Governing Council in 2003. Nor have they forgotten the snubs of Arab governments in the region. While other powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt refused to open embassies in Baghdad, Iran kept its mission open and stayed engaged. And during the sectarian bloodshed of 2006, money and weapons from Iran helped Iraq's Shia defend themselves. No other regional head of state had visited Iraq before Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid a call last year. (An Iraqi official says American diplomats tried to discourage the trip but finally gave in and facilitated Ahmadinejad's travels from Baghdad airport to the Green Zone.)

Maliki has grown bolder lately about asserting Iraq's independence. "As he sees his fortunes go up, you can see him trying to put distance between himself and the Iranians, [just] as he's tried to put more distance between himself and the Americans," says Wayne White, a former State Department analyst. But the Iranians have been pushing back. Dawa parliamentarian Haider al-Abadi quotes the prime minister as saying that last year's drive against militants in Basra uncovered a "snake" that stretched across the eastern border. After government forces captured a notorious Iranian-backed militant, the Basra resistance intensified. "This is from the Iranians," Maliki told colleagues gathered in his improvised Basra war room. To save face, Iran organized talks between senior Dawa figures and radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose troops were armed by Iran. Shabander remembers Maliki at a security conference after the shooting stopped, warning the Sadrists that their Iranian backers could not be trusted. "Those who give you rockets to attack others today will give rockets to others to attack you tomorrow," he told them.

Skeptics say Dawa will always be in bed with Iran, willingly or otherwise. Shabander, who has known Dawa's leadership since the 1970s, says Maliki is surrounded by senior party members with Iranian loyalties who enable Tehran to "run Dawa by remote control," in his words. On the other hand, Dawa members know from experience what a fickle ally Tehran can be. "The Iranians are not necessarily straight. They may say one thing and do something else," says Zuhair al-Naher, Dawa's spokesman in London. "With the Americans there will also be some level of skepticism—but often the Americans have said things and followed through."

There's no way to eliminate Tehran's influence. Iraqi officials note that Iran's $4 billion annual trade with their country is second only to Turkey's $5 billion. And, if necessary, the Iranians can create chaos through the armed militants they continue to support. Maliki suspects one Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander in particular, Qassam Suleimani, of now and then subtly threatening to engineer his ouster, according to Shabander. (Maliki aides deny any such worries.) An American adviser in Baghdad, who asked not to be named discussing Iraqi internal matters, says ranking Iraqis even fear that Iran could attempt to assassinate leaders who stand in their way.

Still, Dawa may finally be settling old scores with the upstarts who took over its exile camp a quarter century ago. This past January, Maliki's party defeated the Supreme Council for the first time in local elections. Tensions are rising between the two longtime rivals, and Tehran seems worried that its favored party may be in trouble. With parliamentary elections due early next year, Iran is pushing Maliki to maintain a coalition with the Supreme Council. "They want everyone to return to one united power," says senior Dawa figure Ali al-Adeeb.

This time, however, Maliki is expected to insist on leading the coalition. Otherwise, party allies say, he has enough support from Sunnis to form a mixed coalition. If they're right, it would bring Iraq that much closer to national reconciliation, and push the country that much further outside Iran's ambit. The question is whether the Iranians are prepared to let that happen—and how far they might go to prevent it.

With Hussam Ali and Saad Al-Izzi in Baghdad and Hassan Al-Jarrah in Najaf

© 2009