The Return of Al Qaeda

The NIE reflects the consensus judgment of U.S. intelligence agencies and is prepared by the National Intelligence Council. A version of the new report, due to be released later this summer, is especially striking because it contrasts in some respects with previous analyses by the U.S. intelligence community. An NIE on "Trends in Global Terrorism"—portions of which were declassified last September—concluded that U.S. counter-terrorism efforts "have seriously damaged the leadership of Al Qaeda and disrupted its operations."

At the same time, however, last year's NIE also warned that Al Qaeda had spawned a jihadi movement that had metastasized, and that radical jihadis were "increasing in both number and geographic dispersion." One cause, the analysis concluded, was the U.S. invasion of Iraq—which intelligence officials said had become a "cause celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihaidst movement."

But the new NIE's conclusions about Al Qaeda activities in Pakistan, along with the increasing signs of jihadi militants flowing out of Iraq, suggest that the U.S. counter-terrorism community may now be facing the worst of both worlds: a reconstituted Al Qaeda leadership coupled with a growing and dispersed worldwide army of angry jihadis inflamed by the U.S. presence in Iraq. The new document's conclusions also could make it more difficult for the White House to argue, as it frequently has in the past, that President Bush's post-9/11 efforts have made the country "safer."

The signs that Al Qaeda leaders have regrouped and reconstituted themselves have been evident in increased intelligence reporting about plots against U.S. interests emanating from the Pakistani border, along with what one official called an unsually "robust" Al Qaeda public-affairs campaign. The organization has realeased sophisticated video and audio messages on average about twice a week. (In just the last week, Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, has released two messages—one audio and one video—in which he rails against U.S. policies. He also threatened to attack Britain in response to the granting of a knighthood to author Salman Rushdie.)

The primary development that has allowed all this to happen, U.S. officials say, was the peace agreement signed last year between the Pakistani Government of President Pervez Musharraf and pro-Taliban tribal leaders in the remote region of North Waziristan. The withdrawal of Pakistani troops under that agreement gave Al Qaeda leaders new freedom to operate with relative impunity, officials said. "Clearly, they are resurgent," said one senior U.S. intelligence official about Al Qaeda. (The official, who is familiar with the NIE's findings, asked not to be identified because the document remains classified.)

The NIE was described by officials as a broad look at potential terrorist threats to the homeland, and includes discussion of a number of worrisome trends, including the rise of so-called "homegrown" jihadis inside the United States who are not necessarily connected to Al Qaeda but inspired by its message. Although a draft of the document is circulating among U.S. security agencies, it is not yet in final form and has not yet been briefed to congressional intelligence committees.  But officials said that its conclusions about the renewed strength of bin Laden's terror organization are not likely to come as a surprise; they are consistent with briefings the panels have been receiving for some time. European officials contacted by Newsweek affirm that recent intelligence they have gathered substantiates the notion that Al Qaeda's high command was regaining strength.