In Iraq, Nothing Succeeds Like Failure

According to Petraeus's own counterinsurgency manual, the mission in Iraq requires many more troops than we've committed to it—at least half a million, with 120,000 projected to subdue Baghdad alone (compared with the 130,000 we have in the entire country now). Thence the surge, which Petraeus rammed through using his considerable influence and prestige in Congress and among the press, conveniently overlooking the fact that a piddling increase of 30,000 troops, while a tremendous strain on an already overstretched military, was still far short of what Iraq needs to be brought under control. By concentrating those troops in Baghdad, and spreading them wide and thin at dozens of small outposts, and urging them to get out and patrol rather than cower behind blast walls, the surge has indeed improved the statistics locally, particularly in Baghdad. But the insurgency just metastasizes elsewhere, to places like Diyala. And one important statistic, coalition casualties, has greatly worsened thanks to the surge. In the first eight months of this year U.S. fatalities were 50 percent or more higher than in any similar period in the war so far (739 by the end of August, compared with 462 during January- August 2006, according to Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, which bases its statistics on Pentagon data). In the meantime, for want of enough troops elsewhere, the U.S. has lost the south and its strategic oilfields to warring Shiite militias and their Iranian sponsors, as the ever-dwindling British contingent has withdrawn to fortifications at the Basra airport.

It is striking that at the moment, in Baghdad at least, the bad guys are largely holding their fire. But can that really be credited to the surge? Possibly. But just as possibly the insurgents may simply be saving their ammunition for a major offensive come Ramadan, which starts this week.

Or perhaps they hope to encourage the Americans to draw back down, knowing that once they do so all the surge gains will evaporate as quickly as peace fled Mosul in Petraeus's wake. The whole point of the surge was to create a security environment in which the political players could peacefully settle their quarrels. But instead what has happened is a massive sectarian cleansing of neighborhoods and towns, continued and even accelerated refugee flight, and no significant progress on the political front in the last year, even during Baghdad's Pax Petraeus. As Ambassador Ryan Crocker put it, "Abandoning or drastically curtailing our efforts will bring failure, and the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood by us all. An Iraq that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human suffering, well beyond what has already occurred." The success of the surge, such as it is, hardly makes a good argument for withdrawing troops; just the opposite, it argues for even more. Petraeus's assertion, qualified as it is, that he sees an opportunity to reduce troops to presurge levels by next summer is motivated more by Washington politics, and the stress on the U.S. military, than the realities on the ground in Iraq. He dare not speak the truth, because to do so would include one of two words, both forbidden in the American political liturgy: defeat and draft.

It's hard not to like David Petraeus, and I have to say I do. He's an admirable leader, an amazing individual, an impressive intellect. But when it comes to Iraq, despite the worshipful attitude in Congress, he's hardly our lord and savior.

© 2007