A Warrior Lays Down His Arms

Some of Rumsfeld's critics also say that much of his transformation was superficial. He was unable to pare down U.S. nuclear forces despite Bush's pledge to do so, sponsoring giant budgets filled with cold-war-era weapons. And they say he was unpardonably negligent in his handling of the central issue of his tenure, Iraq, which is likely to be the subject of fresh inquiries by the Democratic-controlled Congress. "Rumsfeld demanded responsibility for all of postwar Iraq and then did nothing with it," says a former senior Defense official who spoke anonymously "because I have to work in this town." "He tried to destroy the interagency process. And I think he was successful."

Historians will probably argue for decades over who gets most of the blame for the mistakes made in Iraq. But Rumsfeld's talent for bureaucratic infighting did work against success there. He offended allies, played down the State Department's role in planning for postwar Iraq and actively stymied Condoleezza Rice's efforts to do her first-term job as national-security adviser, which was to coordinate between agencies, according to numerous accounts. Sometimes he didn't even return her calls. "Rumsfeld treated Condi like the hired help," says a White House staffer who would discuss the relationship only if he was not identified. "He did everything he could to humiliate her. And the president never intervened." Two weeks ago, Iraq inspector general Stuart Bowen concluded that the Pentagon is still not working well with State in coordinating Provincial Reconstruction Teams, on which the administration once placed high hopes in Iraq.

Rumsfeld was not blind about Iraq. He foresaw clearly the pitfalls of a long foreign occupation. He planned to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq to some 30,000 troops within months of the March 2003 invasion; if he'd had his way, he would have quickly handed over power to the Iraqis. "The secretary saw the Iraq war as his best chance to force the U.S. Army to abandon its cold-war model of a massive buildup taking months--what they did in Gulf War I--and move to a swifter, leaner way of operating," says one of his former top aides who would discuss him only anonymously. But once it became clear that Bush wanted a deeper democratic transformation of Iraq--one that would require a longer occupation--Rumsfeld failed to adjust. And that may be history's bottom line on his troubled tenure.

© 2006