‘24’ Versus the Real World

PAKISTAN INTERIOR MINISTRY

AP

Abu Faraj al-Libbi

Ron Suskind, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist whose book, “The One Percent Doctrine,” stands as the most thorough examination of CIA interrogations thus far, paints a very skeptical picture in his depiction of the interrogations of top Al Qaeda officials. Meanwhile, some experts on torture say the debate over acceptable techniques helped create the 2004 scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In a manner of speaking, Abu Ghraib had nothing to do with the intelligence community’s rules on interrogation. The Abu Ghraib abuses were the work of poorly trained, overwhelmed prison guards. Nonetheless, they were operating in an environment in which it was generally understood that “the gloves were off” when it came to interrogating prisoners. That is the problem with even a limited set of exceptions to an outright ban on torture or “torture lite.” If even some exceptions are made, they can be seen as a license by guards and interrogators. Who is to say that interrogators will stop at a “belly slap” or an “attention grab” if they are permitted to lay hands on the prisoners in a darkened cell? Administration officials have said that “less than five” Al Qaeda officials were subjected to those authorized “aggressive” techniques. But Special Forces soldiers and CIA operatives were roughing up so many prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan that at least a score died.

The Bush administration has tried another approach to end-run critics: farming out torture. For years, American intelligence handed over prisoners to be interrogated by other security services less squeamish about squeezing information out of suspects. These so-called renditions picked up after 9/11. The very first high-ranking Al Qaeda operative captured—Abu Faraj al-Libbi-was first interrogated by the FBI. But when the FBI wanted to use its normal, go-slow methods, the prisoner was turned over to the CIA—who promptly turned him over to the Egyptians. (NEWSWEEK has reported that as al-Libbi was led to a plane routed for Egypt, a CIA operative whispered in his ear that he planned to “f--- your mother”.) Under the no-doubt rough care of the Egyptians, al-Libbi talked of plots and agents. The information was used to make the case for war against Iraq. As recounted in "Hubris," a new book by NEWSWEEK's Michael Isikoff and David Corn, there was only one problem: al-Libbi later recanted, saying that he had lied to stop the torture.

With Mark Hosenball, Michael Hirsh, Michael Isikoff and Steve Tuttle

© 2006