Doctor, Defector, Patriot, Spy

On how long it will take to stabilize the country: "That depends on how quickly we can establish security and our institutions. It also depends on our neighbors ... we need to reduce the number of border crossings and increase cooperation with other countries. Fighting terrorism is largely an intelligence issue."

On the country's new Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS): its charter is "unprecedented in the region" because of its built-in checks and balances. It will not have the authority to detain citizens, its director is limited to a five-year term, and its activities will be subject to legislative oversight. "It'll be like its counterparts in Europe and the U.S. ... It won't have the machinery for domination or control over the population the way Saddam's [intelligence service] did."

On Iraqi politics and ethnic tensions: "You can't have political leadership without institutions ... Iraq's political life is developing its own dynamics ... at the same time we need to tackle the economy, unemployment, financial [issues] and the building of government institutions. We need to develop civil society, so that a sense of Iraqism prevails over Shiism or Sunnism."

Allawi is pro-American, though not slavishly so. In his formal introductory speech, the country's new prime minister thanked the international Coalition "led by the Americans who have sacrificed so much to liberate us." (The other new government members avoided thanking the United States.) Allawi also acknowledged that Iraq would need international help "in defeating the enemies of Iraq." But Allawi hasn't been shy about criticizing Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) policies. From the very start, he made it clear he didn't approve of civilian administrator Paul Bremer's decision to disband the Iraqi armed forces, a move championed by the controversial Ahmed Chalabi who was the Pentagon's undisputed darling at the time.

Allawi also criticized the CPA's overzealous efforts to "de-Baathify" postwar Iraq. That was another unpopular campaign identified with Chalabi, whom Bremer appointed to head the IGC's de-Baathification committee. Bremer eventually acknowledged that "irrational and unfair" procedures resulted in unemployment for tens of thousands of teachers, civil servants and army personnel with only superficial links to Saddam's Baath party--virtually pushing them into the arms of the anti-Coalition resistance. In early April, Bremer softened the de-Baathification practices dramatically. Allawi is expected to accelerate efforts to reach out to former Baathists, especially those with professional, bureaucratic and military expertise. On taking office Allawi promised to facilitate the rehabilitation of former army personnel--and to increase their pensions and pay.

Detractors say Allawi is intent on bringing former Baathists back to power. It is a fact that key aides in the Iraqi National Accord (INA) were former military and intelligence officers who spent much of the '90s trying to topple Saddam in a coup. Paradoxically, his ability to work with ex-Baathists is also the reason why some Sunnis approve of Allawi, who is a secular Shiite. (Saddam's government was dominated by Sunni officers, including many from his own clan.)