Since the establishment of the modern state of Turkey it has been official Turkish policy, as Inonu said at the Turkish Assembly, to "Turkify the inhabitants of this land". A forced assimilation policy has been pursued by the Turkish regime since then. It is fine to say that there have been Turkish Presidents of Kurdish origin but as long as they deny their Kurdish background they are fine. As soon as they stand up and demand Kurdish human and political rights then the only place for them is the grave or jail. The PKK are only the latest in a long history of resistance to Turkish repression. The Turks burnt over 4,000 Kurdish villages, towns and hamlets in the nineties and continue to repress the Kurds. The majority of Kurds in Turkey support the PKK and the only solution is a political and diplomatic one. Journalists and commentators would be of much more use to turn their attention to find out the reasons why Turkey refuses any political offer of ceasefires and political solutions from the Kurdish side. There is no military solution but the Kurdish Freedom Movement is ready both for peace and war!
It’s Not About The West
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For evidence of this strengthened bond, look how far Ankara has moved on Syria. Ten years ago, Turkey, with the wholehearted support of the United States, was threatening to invade Syria for providing shelter to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. Now, the Turks have built a soccer stadium and multimillion-dollar shopping mall in Syria. The new Damascus Stock Exchange, due to open next year, is modeled on its Istanbul counterpart. Officials in Ankara also backed Syria in its protest of last month's Israeli raid—and have backed Syrian claims that Israel must return the Golan Heights as part of any peace deal with the Palestinians.
Indeed, Turkey has gone out of its way to position itself as a talking shop and power broker, equally at home talking to Bashar Assad as George Bush. This week, as part of a major diplomatic effort, Turkey will host a conference of all of Iraq's neighbors. And the feeling between Turkey and Syria appears to be mutual. Assad has just visited Ankara as an honored ally and, as if to underscore the tightening bond, Syria's ambassador to Washington proudly told an audience of Syrian expats in the United States two weeks ago that "our closest ally is not Iran, it's Turkey," according to one attendee.
The same week, Assad expressed support for Turkey's right to act in "self-defense" against north Iraq. Although Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari dismisses Assad's support as a ploy to "appease the Turks" and ease Syria's "isolation," key figures in Turkey's Justice and Development (AK) Party government say creating regional ties is a key part of its national strategy. Egemen Bagis, a top adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, says that since the U.S. attempt "to promote democracy by military means has failed," it is time to try "Turkish democracy promotion." His formula: trade, open dialogue and attempting to defuse threats wherever they may come from.
To this end, Turkey has also found common ground with Iran. It will soon finalize a $3.5 billion deal to develop gas deposits there and finish the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey—in defiance of strong opposition by the United States. Tellingly, Turkey also refused to take a hostile attitude toward Tehran's nuclear program, preferring to use what Turkish President Abdullah Gul calls "very constructive" relations to try to persuade Tehran to comply with the United Nations. For its part, Tehran is helping out Turkey in its fight against the Kurds in Qandil, according to Turkish officials, by passing on intelligence information about the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan, or PJAK, a PKK affiliate, as well as by shelling PKK and PJAK positions.
At base, Turkey's eastward turn stems from the nation's deep disappointment with old friends in the West. Over the last five years, Turkey's elite has spent enormous political capital in an ambitious reform program, closely guided by the EU, with the hope of one day obtaining full membership into the club of European nations. But in the Turkish view, the EU has reneged on its earlier promises. "As the Sarkozys and other [Turko-skeptics] make it quite clear that Turkey isn't getting into the EU in any near-time scenario, Turkey has begun consolidating its relationships," says Joshua Landis, an expert on the region at the University of Oklahoma.
Adding to the pressure to look east for partners is the sentiment on the Turkish Street, which increasingly dismisses the benefits of entry into the EU. Between 2004 and 2006, the percentage of Turks who viewed membership in the EU as a "good thing" fell by 19 points to 54 percent, according to the German Marshall Fund. Anti-U.S. sentiment is rising, too. A Pew Foundation poll last month found that 66 percent of Turks agree that "Western countries want to divide and break Turkey like they divided and broke the Ottoman Empire in the past." More worryingly, an increasingly large number of Turks are also critical of American culture and values. More than 80 percent of Turks now say they "dislike American ideas about democracy," up 31 points since 2002, and 68 percent dislike "American music, movies and television," up 22 points. Even Prime Minister Erdogan is alarmed at the shift. He warned earlier this year that until recently, Turks who disliked the U.S. government still appreciated American people and their culture—but now he sees an "emerging antipathy toward the Americans and the U.S. lifestyle."
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