A Slap in the Face

After reports over the weekend that Badawi was now a free man, the Yemeni Embassy in Washington issued a carefully worded statement that seemed aimed at tamping down U.S. government anger over the incident. The statement insisted that Badawi "remains detained" but principally because of further investigation into a prison escape last year in which he and 22 cohorts, including a number of fellow Al Qaeda figures, were reported to have dug a tunnel that somehow exited exactly inside a nearby mosque. (U.S. officials widely suspected the breakout was an inside job.) The Yemeni statement added: "Jamal is fully cooperating and the Yemeni government is optimistic about receiving crucial information about other Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen and abroad."

Then on Monday of this week, the Badawi situation took another strange turn. After U.S. Ambassador Stephen Seche met with Saleh to protest, Yemeni  authorities invited a U.S. Embassy official to come visit a jail in Aden where they suddenly displayed Badawi behind bars.

But  U.S. officials are suspicious. They noted that the Yemenis typically hold terror suspects in the capital of Sana, an hourlong flight from Aden. "That was a joke," said one knowledgable former counterterrorsim official about the jail visit. (The former official asked not to be identified talking about the politically sensitive situation.) "The jail in Aden is five minutes from [Badawi's] home. It was like he was brought there just a few minutes before."

Although it has so far received relatively little media attention, the Badawi incident has infuriated counterterrorism officials throughout the government and underscored how difficult it is to build alliances in a region where sympathy for Al Qaeda remains strong and hostility toward the United States may be at an all-time high. It also may have repercussions well beyond Yemen. Some U.S. officials have noted that the handling of Badawi plays directly into the hands of hard-line Bush administration officials, principally in Vice President Cheney's office, who oppose shutting down the U.S. detention facility in Guantánamo Bay. The State and Defense Department officials who have pushed for a Gitmo closure have long contended that most of the detainees could be returned for trial and detention in home countries like Yemen—an option that seems less acceptable when confirmed Al Qaeda figures like Badawi are being let go.

Just as significantly, the incident may have prompted U.S. officials to put back on the table more aggressive options for bringing Badawi to justice. Those options, such as extralegal "snatch" operations, were widely used by the CIA in the first few years after 9/11—until they received widespread international criticism and, in a few cases, such as in Italy and Germany, led to investigations of the agency officers involved. (In the Italian case, a number of CIA officers—including the agency's chief of station—have been criminally charged for apprehending a suspected Al Qaeda operative in Milan and flying him to Egypt for interrogation.)

U.S. officials this week declined to discuss what options they are considering for Badawi. Yemeni authorities have consistently told U.S. officials they can't extradite Badawi to the United States under their Constitution. But U.S. officials are exploring the idea of trying to arrange for a third country to take custody of Badawi—and then turn him over to the United States for trial.