Guarding Pakistan’s Nukes

Several U.S. experts also note that in the Pakistani system nuclear warheads are stored separately from missiles that can deliver them. And the most critical parts of the nuclear warheads—the radioactive cores, made up of plutonium or highly enriched uranium—are in turn stored separately from the other parts of the warheads. According to the experts, if terrorists were to get access to parts of the system—even the nuclear cores—they would not necessarily be able to use them to set off a nuclear explosion. Also, the separation of the various elements of the nuclear weapons systems would make it much more difficult for rogue elements of Pakistan's military to seize complete nuclear weapons and threaten other countries with attacks.

Despite such expressions of confidence, U.S. officials acknowledge that in the past Pakistan's nuclear program has been notorious for leaks of equipment and technology. For years before 9/11, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, A. Q. Khan, operated a secret nuclear-proliferation ring that disseminated atomic bomb manufacturing equipment and know-how to rogue regimes like North Korea, Libya and possibly Iran. The ring was only dismantled several months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi renounced his nuclear ambitions and turned over equipment and details of how he obtained it to U.S. and British spy agencies.

U.S. experts say there still may be radical sympathizers in both the Pakistani nuclear establishment and, more critically, inside ISI, Pakistan's sprawling intelligence service, which has its own history of close contacts with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The political instability spurred by Musharraf's current crackdown is unsettling at best. "We're talking about a nuclear power, and a nuclear power that is potentially imploding," said Dormandy.

Terror Watch, written by Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball , appears online weekly

© 2007