Pakistan’s Pinstripe Revolution

On many of these issues, Musharraf's reforms were not as comprehensive as he claimed, nor was his break with the Taliban. But he did things that neither of his democratically elected predecessors—Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto—had dared to do. He reaped the rewards of his actions, gaining popular approval at home (for the first five years of his rule) as well as staunch international support, especially from the Bush administration. With the economy growing at a brisk 7 percent annually, most Pakistanis were content if not happy with his reign.

But Musharraf never tried to build a political base for his moderate approach and ally with other mainstream, secular parties, such as Sharif's Muslim League or Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. While these parties are feudal and often corrupt, they do represent the interests of many Pakistanis and have grassroots organizations that can mobilize people with considerable skill. Musharraf saw them as threats to his rule, and so he allied with whatever forces would bolster him instead, whether regional or religious in nature. His party was built on one man, nothing more, and developed no roots in the body politic. In a way, this reflected his own personality. Musharraf disdains politics. In 2004, when he was riding high in the polls, I asked him why he wouldn't run for the presidency in a direct election. "I am not a politician," he said. He never realized that to rule his country, he had to become one.

Can he last? Much depends on the Army, which remains the dominant force in Pakistani life. For now it seems to be behind him. "He has placed all the right people in the right positions," retired Pakistani Army Lt. Gen. Talat Masood says of the recent reshuffle of the Army's high command. "So they are unlikely to say no to him out of personal loyalties for now." But the emergency regulations and the widespread arrests of Supreme Court judges, lawyers, and civic and political activists are so unpopular that the strong public backlash is bound to influence the armed forces. "The Army reflects the opinion of society, so to think that the Army has a completely different opinion than the people on this would be wrong," says Masood.

It remains crucial to keep the Pakistani military completely involved and comfortable with the changes that are taking place. Like it or not, Pakistan's military runs the country. (Here is a lesson from Iraq: recognize and respect the sources of stability and order in a country, whether or not they conform to a textbook version of democracy.) And the Army believes, with some accuracy, that it has already been abandoned once by the United States and the West. After a four-decades-long alliance with America, after helping to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, Pakistan was "ditched" by Washington in 1989 (Musharraf's word). It had to deal with the aftermath of the anti-Soviet campaign—4 million Afghan refugees and a floundering economy—by itself. And after its 1998 nuclear tests, the United States sanctioned, fined and isolated Pakistan. Were such a break to take place a second time, it is unlikely that Washington would ever again be trusted by Pakistan's military establishment.

The best course for Pakistan would be for Musharraf to be forced to get back on the course he had outlined before imposing emergency rule—to hold elections soon and resign as Army chief of staff. Were he to do this quickly and end the emergency, he might be able to keep the presidency, though it will be a far weaker position than he might expect. Power in Pakistan lies in two places: constitutionally with the prime minister and operationally with the Army chief of staff. By the end of February next year, if the current plans stay intact, Musharraf will hold neither post. But if he were to stay on as a titular head of state, with some powers, that might be a workable compromise. Many commentators have made analogies to the Shah of Iran and Ferdinand Marcos. They do not really apply. Musharraf is unlikely to need to flee into exile; most Pakistanis seem to see him not as a monster but as a man who overstayed his welcome. There are those who hate him with a passion—Al Qaeda and the Taliban—but they are enemies of modern Pakistan itself.

Many observers are frightened by what is happening in Pakistan. The country is seen as a collapsed state, filled with jihadis, nukes and badlands. Chaos there can only be bad news. While there are reasons to be concerned, they can be exaggerated. The Pakistani military is a professional and disciplined organization with control over the nuclear program. And what is happening now could be seen as a sign of progress. The fact that the first crowds to take to the streets to protest emergency rule were pinstriped lawyers is a testament to the strength of civil society in Pakistan. After years of political calm and economic growth, the society has stabilized, and has developed an educated, Westernized middle class. Pakistanis' sense of the rule of law is growing. All of this makes arbitrary military rule harder to sustain. The difference between Musharraf and Hugo Chávez lies also in their respective countries. Pakistan had fallen on bad times in the 1990s, but it has serious traditions of law, human rights and democracy. In a strange sense, Musharraf's success in stabilizing the country has reignited those forces.