Venezuela Solidarity Network (US) Statement on the Dec. 2, 2007 Referendum, Dec. 3, 2007
Part Two of Two:
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It is time for the US government and US corporate media to acknowledge that
Venezuela??s electoral process is free and fair. Its electronic voting
machines issue paper receipts which make fraud almost impossible. We only
can wish that electronic voting in the US were as reliable. A defeat by
only 1-1/2 percent would have been converted to a victory by those in power
in many countries. Mexico??s long tradition of dirty elections easily comes
to mind, as do our own last two (or more) rigged elections.
It is time for the US government to stop interfering in Venezuela??s
democracy and time for the US corporate media to stop aiding and abetting
it. Reports are that the US government, through the US Agency for
International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy, spent $8
million of US taxpayer??s money to influence the vote on the referendum.
That would be the equivalent of a foreign country spending $92.6 million on
a national referendum ?? if we had such a democratic tool ?? in the US. Would
we tolerate that? The Venezuela Solidarity Network organized a delegation to
Venezuela in October of 2006 to investigate US government interference in
that year??s presidential election. The US embassy official who met with us
freely admitted that the US was spending $26 million on Venezuela??s
presidential election. What would be the reaction in the US if Venezuela
spent the equivalent $301 million on our upcoming presidential election?
It is time for the US government to close the Office of Transition
Initiatives housed in the US embassy in Caracas. Venezuela??s transition to
a real democracy that began with the rejection of the old political parties
of the elites in 1998 is alive and well and doesn??t need any so-called
??democracy building?? from the United States. Indeed, there??s a lot we could
learn about democracy from the Venezuelans.
Nerves
The high price of oil is about the only thing Venezuela's Hugo Chavez has got going for him.
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President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela is not exactly on a roll. Yes, oil prices remain close to $100 per barrel, and there are worse things that can happen than receiving tax-free revenues of up to $300 million every day. But on the eve of a Dec. 2 referendum, called by Chávez, that would substantially modify the constitution he himself wrote just a few years ago, he seems more isolated and weaker, domestically and abroad, than at any time since the 2003 oil workers' strike.
Now Chávez is nervous. The constitutional reforms he proposes are neither necessary nor dramatic. The most controversial change—the possibility of indefinite or perpetual re-election—is not relevant until 2012, when his current term ends. Other modifications, such as replacing elected local officials with appointed provincial councils, eliminating the independence of the central bank, or establishing limits on private property, are not inconsequential, but Chávez could pursue his construction of "21st-century socialism" without them. Yet instead of just letting matters rest, he has chosen to challenge his opposition and reaffirm his mandate.
He may come to regret his boldness. Polls this week indicate that the electorate is slightly tilted against the reforms. They also indicate that if a significant number of Venezuelans turn out to vote, as they were urged to do by foreign dignitaries ranging from Jimmy Carter to former Sandinista vice president of Nicaragua Sergio Ramirez, the result could become complicated for Chávez. He has already suffered the defection of one of his closest military supporters, former minister of defense Raúl Isaías Baduel, who called the referendum an "institutional coup d'état," and faces a swelling, vigorous and increasingly strident opposition from the Catholic Church and the country's university students, traditionally a bellwether of government popularity. On the eve of the referendum a growing number of analysts (though not international electoral observers: Chávez ruled against inviting them) were predicting an extremely close outcome, and a rising probability of significant vote tampering.
All of this perhaps explains Chávez's otherwise incomprehensible antics in the international arena over the past weeks. First he picked a major quarrel with José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the socialist prime minister of Spain, by accusing Zapatero's predecessor, conservative José María Aznar, of being a "fascist serpent, worse than a human being." Then, when Juan Carlos I, the Spanish monarch, told him to "shut up," Chávez had an ally, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, attack Spanish companies, forcing the king to abandon the room where all of this was taking place, at the 16th Ibero-American Summit in Chile.
Subsequently, instead of trying to mend fences with the Spaniards, the Venezuelan leader demanded that Juan Carlos apologize. Needless to say, this has not occurred, and Chávez loudly announced he was "freezing" relations with Spain. He also "froze" relations with his neighbor, Colombia, after its president, Alvaro Uribe, cut off a misguided mediation effort by Chávez that Uribe had originally approved, whereby the Caracas caudillo would attempt to free a number of Colombian, American and French hostages held by the FARC, the main Colombian guerrilla group. Chávez responded with his now customary insults—Uribe, he said, was nothing more than a "puppet" of the United States—and recalled his ambassador in Bogotá.
But beyond the eccentricities, there is a logic to all of this. Chávez is trying to re-ignite nationalist fervor in Venezuela against outside enemies. Neighboring Colombia, a country with which Venezuela has historical rivalries and an immense current trade deficit, and former colonial ruler Spain fit the bill nicely, even if Washington and the Bush administration would be preferable. Chávez hopes that these new conflicts will save the day for him electorally in two ways: first, by mobilizing public opinion, and second, and more importantly, by constructing a before-the-fact justification for dismissing possible postelection claims by the opposition that the vote was rigged or stolen. If and when the opposition seeks international support for its potential accusations of electoral fraud—and, mainly, if it begins to receive such support—Chávez will be able to point to the previous conflicts as proof of an international conspiracy, hatched in Washington, Madrid and the Colombian capital, to unseat him and quash his Bolivarian Revolution.
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