High-Stakes Science

This is in response to Dr. Klempner's post stating that smallpox will not be studied at the BU's proposed lab. This infectious agent and disease are clearly listed in the Final Environmental Impact Report, vol. 2, appendix 2-9 as an infectious agent that may be studied at the NEIDL. Since this report was prepared by BU and was approved by both NIH and MEPA, the inclusion of Variola major as a possible agent to be studied in the NEIDL must be taken seriously. The fact that research on smallpox is currently restricted in an international agreement should not be seen as hindering this possibility. In the past several years, the US government has shown that they are willing to toss aside long-standing international agreements, such as the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as block discussion on any verification mechanism to the Biological Weapons Convention. When asked about this in a community meeting, Dr. Klempner and Murphy had no explanation. If BU and NIH claim that their inclusion of Variola major as an agent researched in lab in their FEIR is an over-sight, then it is a gross and dangerous over-sight and calls into question the level of attention went into the entire review process.
Sincerely,
Marc Pelletier
Boston, MA

This is in response to Dr. Klempner's claim that smallpox would not be studied in BU's proposed NEIDL, This infectious agent and disease are clearly listed in the Final Environmental Impact Report, vol. 2, appendix 2-9 as an infectious agent that may be studied at the NEIDL. Since this report was prepared by BU and was approved by both NIH and MEPA, the inclusion of Variola major as a possible agent to be studied in the NEIDL must be taken seriously. The fact that research on smallpox is currently restricted in an international agreement should not be seen as hindering this possibility. In the past several years, the US government has shown that they are willing to toss aside long-standing international agreements, such as the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as block discussion on any verification mechanism to the Biological Weapons Convention. Therefore, Variola major must be considered in a comprehensive assessment of risk posed by the NEIDL. Since the FEIR also states that this virus could be used in the BSL-3 lab, this level of biosecurity must also be included in the model. If BU and NIH claim that their inclusion of Variola major as an agent researched in BSL-3 in their FEIR is an over-sight, then it is a gross and dangerous over-sight and calls into question what level of attention went into the entire review process.
Sincerely,
Marc Pelletier
Boston, MA

I am writing in reference to the article entitled ???High Stakes Science,??? by Jeneen Interlandi in the current edition of Newsweek. It is necessary to correct the facts.

In the article, long-time lab critic Dr. David Ozonoff of Boston University is quoted as saying the new Boston University biosafety level 4 laboratory will study smallpox and inhalation anthrax and their use as bioweapons.

This is not true. There is only one place in the US where smallpox research is permitted ??? at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. BU will not study, indeed cannot study, smallpox at the new laboratory.

Boston University has also publicly pledged that it would not conduct any classified, secret bioweapons research (such as on weaponized anthrax). Finally Boston University will own, operate and determine the research agenda for the new laboratory. It is not true that ???the CIA and Department of Defense???would be allowed to use the lab for their own research.???

Sincerely,
Mark S. Klempner, M.D.
Associate Provost for Research
Boston University Medical Campus
Director, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories Institute