Make Iran an Offer It Might Refuse

The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran has upended the Bush administration's policy toward that country. This could be a good thing, if it leads to some creative rethinking. Over the past two years the administration has made several intelligent moves in its effort to isolate Iran—keeping the Europeans onboard, rallying the Arab states—but it's been unwilling to make a simple choice. Do we want policy change in Iran or regime change?

Imagine, for a moment, what the world looks like to Iran. The country is surrounded by powerful states with nuclear weapons—Israel, India, Pakistan, China and Russia. Across one of its borders stand some 170,000 American troops (in Iraq), across another are more than 50,000 NATO troops (in Afghanistan). The United States has been bitterly opposed to the Iranian regime for three decades. The current American president has made clear time and again that he regards the Tehran government as evil and wishes that it would fall, and Congress set aside $75 million last year to "promote democracy" in Iran. Now, if you were in Tehran, wouldn't you buy some insurance? And in the world of international politics, a nuclear program is the ultimate insurance policy.

For Washington to threaten a regime with extinction and simultaneously expect it to disarm is a policy doomed to failure. Were we to be clear that what we seek from Tehran is only a change in behavior, a policy of sticks and carrots might actually produce results.

The Iran NIE may or may not be accurate in its details. The truth is we know very little about what goes on inside that country. But its central thrust, confirmed by diplomats who have negotiated with the Iranians, is clearly correct—for years, Iran has been rationally calculating costs and benefits on the nuclear issue. In fact, Tehran has been less messianic and stubborn about its nuclear development than Pakistan, India or China, all of whom pressed ahead with their programs rapidly and secretly. Tehran has moved incrementally, allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct inspections for years (although not entirely to the IAEA's satisfaction) and been sensitive to pressures and inducements from the West.

But the West, meaning Washington, has been stingy in its offers of carrots, which have often been too little and come too late. One European diplomat, who is not authorized to speak on the record, notes that "Iran did in fact stop enrichment in 2003 and had expected to be rewarded for it, as we, the Europeans, had promised them. But our offer was pretty thin because of America's stand. In 2005 the Americans finally came onboard and we made a good proposal. But by then the [Iranian] reformers had been discredited, it was three weeks before the election, and [hard-liner Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad became president."

In fact, one of the oddities of Iran is that it enjoys more open debate than any other Middle Eastern country (with the exception of Israel). In the last month alone, reformist former president Mohammed Khatami addressed a rally at which the crowd chanted "Death to the dictator," referring to the current president. Ahmadinejad accused his opponents of treason and had the former nuclear negotiator, Hossein Mousavian, arrested. And prominent clerics in Iran criticized Ahmadinejad, a layman, for trying to challenge their authority. The Iranian system can be influenced because there are competing centers of power within it, each viewing Iran's interests somewhat differently.