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By Ron Moreau
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Even his supporters say that Hamid Karzai is best suited to lead Afghanistan because of what he's not. He is not an obstreperous warlord with blood on his hands, plunder on his mind and a ragtag army. He is not tainted by association with the mujahedin who flattened Kabul after driving out the Soviets, or with the fanatical Taliban who took their place. He is not a bully, or a crook, or a chauvinist, or a zealot--none of the things that have defined Afghan leaders over the past 23 years. During the six weeks he spent behind enemy lines, masterminding the collapse of the Taliban in their southern Pashtun strongholds, he never once held a gun.
He also lacks certain leadership qualities. "He is alone, doesn't represent a party, has no political base outside his tribe and is not widely known in Afghanistan," says a Western diplomat in Islamabad. Negotiators in Bonn chose the 44-year-old Karzai to head the Afghan interim government that takes office on Dec. 22 in part because he hadn't collected as many enemies as other candidates. But many inside and outside Afghanistan wonder whether the tribal leader may be too quiet, thoughtful and unassuming to govern a land still dominated by brash warlords.
Much of Karzai's standing among Afghans derives from his position as head of the Populzai clan, part of the Durrani tribe that has traditionally provided the country's kings. Until recently, he had played a relatively small role in Afghanistan's wars. In the late 1980s he served as the smooth-talking public-relations man for a mujahedin faction based in Peshawar, where because of his moderate mien and fluent English, he became a favorite contact for visiting U.S. dignitaries. He worked briefly as a deputy foreign minister in the postcommunist mujahedin government in Kabul, before factional infighting drove him to relocate to Quetta, Pakistan. From there Karzai initially supported the Taliban with arms and money. But he quickly grew disillusioned with the mullahs' acidic interpretation of Islam, and after his father was assassinated by suspected Taliban agents in 1999, he spoke loudly--including in U.S. congressional hearings--of the dangers posed by the regime.
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While he never took up arms against the Taliban, Karzai did spend his time in Pakistan learning the intricacies of tribal etiquette and negotiation from his father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, an adviser to the former king, Mohamad Zahir Shah. "One of his strengths is that he knows intimately the very complex, southern Pashtun tribal society," says Edmund McWilliams, a former U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan in the late 1980s.
In fact, Karzai's campaign to undermine the Taliban was waged almost entirely by satellite phone, says Capt. Jason Amerine, the Green Beret officer who led a team of 11 Special Forces troops assigned to help him. While the Americans trained the burgeoning number of troops joining Karzai--leading offensives and calling in airstrikes against Taliban positions--the soft-spoken tribal leader spent most of his time in councils where he would allow everyone to speak, then quietly lay down the law. He raised his voice only once--to a camp servant--yet managed to secure the relatively bloodless surrender of Kandahar and then to negotiate a truce between two allies competing for control of the city. "He was swift. There were no dramatics," says Amerine.
That light touch should serve Karzai well in his dealings with non-Pashtun leaders, too. Those who know him say he is not only smart and articulate, but more important, able to project an extraordinary air of sincerity and concern. On only his second day in Kabul--still controlled by the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance who will hold 18 out of the 30 posts in the interim government--he drove up to the Panjshir Valley to pay homage at the grave site of slain resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. "He has never shown any prejudice or discrimination towards other ethnic groups in Afghanistan," says Abdul Hafiz Mansour, the outgoing Northern Alliance Information minister. "People will support Karzai because of this."
Younger non-Pashtun officials like Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Interior Minister Younis Qanooni are well aware that the government would not wield nearly as much legitimacy with an ethnic minority at the top. And even old warhorses like former president Burhanuddin Rabbani--who initially blasted the accord but said he would support Karzai--seem to understand that this is not the time for griping. Once Karzai begins to develop an independent power base, though, that bonhomie could evaporate quickly. Already the Northern Alliance is pushing to keep the size of any international peacekeeping force down to 1,000 troops--too small to seriously threaten its hold on Kabul. ("Afghans are capable of maintaining their own security. They liberated their own country," claims Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim.) If the government attempts to extend its authority, powerful regional actors like Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum in Mazar-e Sharif and Haji Qadir in Jalalabad have the men and guns to resist anything but a major international presence.
At the same time, Afghan politics may themselves be shifting to a battleground more favorable to Karzai. As the country begins the process of reconstruction, billions of dollars in aid money will need to be disbursed to the regions. The task is best suited to a figure without vested interests or an army to pay--and one with centralized authority. "The critical thing is that everyone should work with and through Karzai so that he can consolidate and wield power," says McWilliams. Otherwise Afghanistan's neighbors may be tempted to curry influence by dealing directly with their former allies: India and Russia have already made overtures to Northern Alliance ministers, while the Pakistanis could revive their support for proxies like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar if they don't feel they have enough sway with the new government. "Any sort of interference will definitely be bad for Afghanistan," Karzai says. Understated as always, he doesn't need to spell out what it might mean for him.
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