Evil In The Cross Hairs

Such tricky issues of American intrusion on national sovereignty are among the considerations weighing on America's regional military commanders, the CINCs who act as virtual viceroys in some parts of the world. A cautious concern for diplomacy, for not acting unilaterally as an arrogant superpower, is desirable and healthy, says a former high-ranking official in the Clinton administration. "I hope someone is drawing lines," says the official. "You don't want CINCs dropping into Yemen, popping someone in the head and leaving again. That would be a big reach from where we've been." The notion that America is "at war" with terrorists is not justification enough, says the official. "We have a war on drugs, too, but we don't kill drug lords." (The former official did add, however, "we have proxies who do.")

The U.S. military has generally preferred massive operations to stealthy hit jobs. "Of course the war on terrorism will involve us targeting individuals around the world," says Gen. Wesley Clark, former commander of U.S. European forces. "The military view is that by and large it is not going to be done by the military. It ought to be done by the CIA and others, and we would be prepared to support if directed to do so." The military's insistence on going in massively or not at all has made it a balky, perhaps overly cautious force in recent years. "You couldn't get them to do anything," says the former Clinton official. "And they'd undermine attempts by the agency to run special ops that required military support. The military's plan would be so unwieldy you couldn't do it." The official notes that the CIA flies Predator drone spy planes with a team of only a dozen operators, while the military requires several times that number.

Early in the war against terrorism, Central Command (CENTCOM), the Florida-based headquarters responsible for military operations in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, was slow to give the green light to hit certain targets. In mid-October, for instance, Navy Capt. Shelly Young, the judge advocate general for CENTCOM's Gen. Tommy Franks, vetoed a bombing attack on a Taliban convoy of SUVs, according to an administration source. The target was so obvious that General Franks's lawyers were worried about a trap: had the Taliban invited an attack on women and children to create TV images of atrocity? "No CINC wants to be accused of war crimes," says the source, "so they're very careful."

At the Pentagon, Rumsfeld is known to have leaned hard on General Franks and the other commanders to be more aggressive and imaginative. It was Rumsfeld who pushed Franks to send in more Special Forces commandos to work with the Northern Alliance to coordinate attacks with U.S. bombing raids. Rumsfeld is said by close colleagues to have become frustrated with the sometimes ponderous military mind-set. The Defense secretary wants to make greater and more effective use of elite Special Forces who have been trained in "snatch and grab" operations. Rumsfeld's barely concealed impatience reflects a widely shared view that modern-day military commanders have become risk-averse. Says former senator Warren Rudman, a Korean War combat veteran: "If Patton were a CINC, he wouldn't be concerned."

On the other hand, there are many military men with strong memories of the moral compromises and ultimate futility of American intervention in Vietnam. Jeff Smith, former general counsel of the CIA and a West Point graduate, knows of classmates who still have trouble sleeping because of their involvement in the Phoenix Program, a brutal Vietnam counterinsurgency program that resulted in thousands of assassinations of Viet Cong and their sympathizers. "Americans are not assassins," says Smith. "There is a good reason for the ban on assassinations. The United States stands for the rule of law. I'm troubled by the U.S. engaging in assassinations because it creates a precedent that assassinations are a legitimate tool of international behavior." He worries that terrorists and outlaw governments will be encouraged to take aim at American leaders. Others worry that if terrorist leaders feel personally threatened, they will lash out in rage. Senator Rudman scoffs at that argument, noting that Al Qaeda has already signaled its desire to send suicide bombers flying into the White House and the Capitol. "How the hell more angry can they get?" asks Rudman.

There is one more argument against assassination plots: they are difficult to carry out and often fail. The CIA's history of botched attempts to knock off Fidel Castro in the 1960s (hiring the Mafia, using exploding cigars) would be funny if it weren't tragic. In Congress, the oversight committees set up after those plots were revealed in the mid-1970s are watching closely to guard against repeat disasters--even as the agency has been unleashed. Sen. Richard Shelby, the ranking Republican on the Senate intelligence committee, says the CIA has been "given the go-ahead by presidential order to untie their hands and take the shackles off. They were told to get moving, basically, and given the backing of the president and Congress to do whatever it took." An intelligence source tells NEWSWEEK that the money available for bribing foreign officials and paying informants has increased by a factor of 10 since September 11, while rules restricting the CIA from dealing with torturers and murderers have largely been wiped away. Nonetheless, says Shelby, "I would be careful in just assassinations per se. That's a double-edged sword." U.S. forces, he says, should pursue Al Qaeda, and "if they resist, kill them. If they surrender, let's take them into custody. As far as sending in a hit team to take these guys out, I don't know about that." He says the intelligence committee would be briefed on any such operations, though, he concedes, "there are always things we don't know."