A Revolution Betrayed

That's why, now more than ever, the United States must reaffirm its support for Arab democracy. How Washington goes about this is critical. America tends to be clumsy when imposing its principles abroad, and events in Abu Ghraib and Guant?namo have undermined, in many Arab eyes, the nation's claim to stand for human rights and freedom.

So how exactly should the United States handle the Middle East in the coming years? For starters, Washington should gradually build democratic stepping stones in the region, consolidating democracy or democratic practices in some places in order to encourage democratic tendencies elsewhere. The United States should also remember that, although democracy cannot be spread with the barrel of a gun, the use of force in favor of democratic movements—or the threat to intervene—can still prove decisive at critical moments.

The United States should consider several lessons from Lebanon's experience. First, the ad hoc nature of the 2005 demonstrations against Syria teaches that democracy promotion can be a messy and unpredictable process. In some places, liberal impulses will triumph; in others, they will fail. Democracy is unlikely to break out everywhere at the same time. But when it does, as in Lebanon, Washington should be ready to support it.

Democracy is unpredictable in another sense as well: in terms of whom the people choose to elect. In many places, Islamists are now the only organized opposition that exists to authoritarian regimes, since these tyrants have suffocated liberals. That's why free votes in places such as Egypt and Jordan would likely bring more Islamists to power. America thus faces a stark choice: to help either the autocrats or the Islamists. It should not rule out dealing with the former. But its priority must be to more aggressively build and defend a secular liberal center.

The process will require great patience and will be characterized by ignorance and misunderstanding on all sides. There will be times when the United States will decide to side with unsavory regimes to suit its geopolitical needs. And Arab liberals will, out of a sense of nationalism, sometimes prefer a homegrown dictator to Washington's help. But local liberals and Americans must remember that their ultimate interests lie together. The absence of domestic freedoms in the Middle East will only turn more and more Arabs against the United States. And liberals who refuse outside support will become even more vulnerable than they are today. The best way to improve Washington's image, therefore, is for the United States to help create more open societies in the region.

The Bush administration was naive to assume that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would transform the Middle East into a citadel of democracy. But it was right about the power of political emancipation. For Washington to turn its back on all that now and abandon the cause of Arab freedom would be disastrous. The Middle East is moving toward more openness; change is coming one way or another. The United States would be better off shaping the outcome itself, rather than allowing others far less concerned about democracy to do so.