An Unlikely New Ally

Only the third group, made up of the most cosmopolitan elites, recognizes that the recent decline in U.S. prestige and leadership could actually hurt China. Top scholars such as Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, believe that Washington's self-inflicted wounds could have dangerous international repercussions. "The U.S. … capability to influence the world has weakened. This has brought both hope and trouble. The hope is that the world's sole superpower can no longer act recklessly. But the trouble is the U.S. nevertheless keeps some sort of stable order." Although few senior Chinese officials openly acknowledge the value of the public goods the United States provides—such as free trade, safe sea lanes, technological innovation and regional stability—many are aware of just how much China benefits from them and know it could not have grown so fast without them. In this camp's view, Washington may push Beijing around on currency, deter its behavior toward Taiwan and lecture it on human rights. But these are the costs of doing business with the world's only superpower. The United States may be annoying, in other words, but it's a price worth paying.

Of the three camps, the first (the realists) is the most dominant, both within and outside government. Paranoid nationalists may have bigger mouths, but they have no influence on policy. If pressed, moreover, even this camp would find it hard to deny that Bush's failed policies have been a boon for China. That makes it easy to understand why even an America led by a man who's been called the worst president in history still has plenty of fans in Beijing.

Pei is the director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of “China’s Trapped Transition.”

© 2007