Scrambling for a Response

On the day of her return in October, a suicide bomber struck the triumphal procession escorting her from the Karachi airport to her home, killing more than 100 people. Bhutto herself was the likely target; the bomber had been trying to push through the throng to her car.

Musharraf declared a state of emergency on Nov. 3. Bhutto condemned this, as did administration officials. But Pakistani officials, among them personal emissaries Musharraf sent to Washington to explain his thinking, insisted that Musharraf feared that the giant election rallies Bhutto was planning to hold around the country would be an irresistible target for further suicide bombings like the Karachi attack. Declaring a state of emergency gave Musharraf the power to ban those rallies, they argued. Under heavy U.S. pressure, though, Musharraf raised the emergency on Dec. 15. Bhutto immediately embarked on a series of rallies. In Rawalpindi, the old military garrison town a short way south of the capital, Islamabad, what Bhutto anticipated came to pass.

So far, no group has claimed responsibility for the killing. The initial presumption in Washington is that Al Qaeda or one of the homegrown Islamist factions in Pakistan was responsible. But as long as the culprits are uncertain, Musharraf's own government will be suspected. Says Cordesman, "So long as we don't know who was responsible, there are going to be people in Pakistan who will allege a conspiracy."

Certainly Washington is going to have questions about the adequacy of the security given to Bhutto. After the Karachi carnage in October, Bhutto accused Musharraf's government of failing to provide proper security. Administration sources in Washington say that Rice personally urged Musharraf to provide Bhutto with at least the same security as that given to his own prime minister. (Musharraf's own security is the responsibility of a special contingent of the Pakistani Army's Special Services Group, headed by a brigadier.) Police did foil at least one attempt to kill Bhutto: at a Bhutto rally in Peshawar only days ago, police arrested a suicide bomber who had an explosive charge hung around his neck.

In this crisis the role of the Pakistani Army will obviously be critical. Washington has long seen the army as a force for stability in Pakistan. Back in the 1980s the then-president, Zia ul-Haq—a devout Muslim—deliberately promoted both in the army and in Pakistan's main intelligence service, the ISI, officers of similarly devout views. But Musharraf has steadily purged these in an effort to restore an officer corps of nonpartisan professionals. And Musharraf's chosen successor as army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is in that mold. Kayani did a couple of training courses in the United States, including a spell at Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Kayani is highly regarded by U.S. officers who know him.

If the Pakistani Army is likely to stay united, though, it may be the only thing in Pakistan that does. Ullman, Bhutto's friend and adviser, predicts, "There will be huge unrest. There could even be civil war. This is a catastrophe."