WHEN THE LEADERS OF KOSOVO'S NEARLY 2 MILLION Albanians met with President Clinton on May 29, he repeated a favorite administration mantra--that the United States would not let Kosovo become another Bosnia. In truth, America and its allies are replicating exactly the failed approach they took in the early 1990s, when Yugoslavia began to fall apart. Every day the death toll in Kosovo climbs. The U.S. government has used neither force nor diplomacy in dealing with the problem, only procrastination, incessant meetings and endless and frequently changing rhetoric.
During the past decade Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic has removed Kosovo's autonomy, imposed a repressive Serbian police rule, and encouraged the development of an apartheid society meant to drive ethnic Albanians from the region. The Clinton administration shrugged. So, in the past three months, the independence-seeking Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has stepped up its insurrection, and Serb forces have responded with wholesale violence. Finally, the violence has produced some Western attention.
For all of its massive failure in Bosnia, the Bush administration recognized the implications of a Kosovo explosion and drew a red line there. In his Christmas warning of 1992, Bush told Milosevic not to unleash his military force against the Albanians. Milosevic did not cross the line. The Clinton administration has not sent a similar clear-cut message to Milosevic.
Instead, Clinton has adopted a strategy that failed in Bosnia: lots of fulminating, some carrots but no real sticks. The United States persuaded Milosevic to begin direct talks with the Albanian nonviolent movement by promising to lift some sanctions on Yugoslavia. Clinton did not make ending violence against the Albanians a part of the deal. In effect, Milosevic felt free to continue his brutal crackdown. The result: Right now, Milosevic's forces are trying to seal off the border with Albania and to destroy Albanian villages in mid-Kosovo. Albanians are being killed and ethnically cleansed by the same methods the Serbs used in Bosnia. Thousands of refugees have been created.
The basic truth is that Milosevic has virtually lost Kosovo for Serbia. Milosevic can effectively control the territory for the long term in only one way--by driving out the bulk of the 2 million Albanians who live there. He may still try to do that. Meanwhile, his focus on destroying the Albanian insurgents by force keeps driving more of the Serbs--already fewer than 200,000--out of Kosovo, reducing even further the rationale for holding on to the province.
For the West (and for the Balkans) Kosovo represents an enormously difficult problem. Independence for Kosovo would be a mortal threat to the stability of Macedonia, with its large Albanian population, to the Bosnian peace settlement and to the southern Balkans in general. That is why the West insists on keeping Kosovo in Serbia. Unfortunately, that policy collides with the reality on the ground. Kosovo also raises the issue of NATO. Does the alliance have the will to deal with the real security issues of Europe?
The U.S. approach this past month has been to turn to Milosevic. Intentionally or not, Washington has buttressed his political position by reducing sanctions and allowing him to continue his war. It is letting him get away with destroying the remaining free media in Serbia. And it has all but branded as terrorists the Albanian insurgents seeking independence. In return, Milosevic from time to time was expected to make minor concessions to the Albanians. That policy is now clearly bankrupt.
In any event, unless the United States soon produces something far more tangible for the Albanian side, the country's moderate leadership could be swept away; the KLA has grown rapidly since the violence started. At the very least, the Albanians want the Serb police and special forces removed and their shadow government turned into public reality. While that would run the risk of hastening the province's slide toward independence, the alternative is more violence.
Investment sanctions did not stop the violence, nor did their suspension. Now, the United States is talking about reimposing them. That won't eliminate the carnage and it certainly won't solve the Kosovo problem. So what's to be done? I propose the following:
If the West is not prepared to threaten and, if necessary, use force to stop the fighting, Milosevic must be told that either he must cooperate with efforts to solve the problem or the West will do everything possible to bring him down, including, if necessary, supporting and arming the KLA. The Kosovo issue has to be resolved within one year, and in return sanctions against Serbia will be lifted.
Kosovo will remain a part of Serbia.
The violence must be ended within 72 hours. The Serb police and special forces must be withdrawn within six months, though the military can remain on the border. The Serb population must be protected and all historical and religious sites cared for. To guarantee both, NATO will deploy a peacekeeping force.
Within one year a newly elected Parliament will take over the running of Kosovo. The West will help create a police force.
NATO units should immediately be stationed in Macedonia.
A Kosovo solution will not come easily, and requires Western involvement. That is certainly preferable to continuing uncontrolled violence with its terrible implications for Kosovo's neighbors.
ABRAMOWITZ is a board member of the International Crisis Group and a former assistant secretary of State.