The President gave yet another speech on (03.19.08). What bothered me was his refusal to stray form past catch phrases and bumper sticker stats Yes Saddam was a bad man. OK. We knew that. If that was the reason why we are there, we should be in regions in Africa, the Far East, and other Middle Eastern Nations like Saudi Arabia. Sorry, I do not buy what he is still selling as justification. The White House has been making the claim that the War has experienced success all along the way. Then why are there still 135,000 soldiers and over 100,000 contractors there at present? That is not counting Afghanistan. I have heard people defend the War with the excuse that, we have troops all over the word so why should we care about troops in Iraq. Well George Washington would call it a foreign entanglement that is not healthy for National Security nor is it healthy at 2.5 to 3.5 trillion dollars. The President continues to make the assertion that the actions have made the Nation safer. Well then we should stop paying attention to the reports of other government agencies and experts who have proven otherwise. We only have to watch the daily reports of yet another bombing or loss of soldiers from all the theaters of conflict and the truth becomes self-evident. He can say what he wants now that he will be passing the buck to a successor. The concept of pre-emptive war is not a true deterrent to war because it is still war. Why can we not realize this? War does not prevent War that is why pre-emptive use of force policy is a paradox. Can you have pre-emptive sex in order to prevent sex? If you do, use protection. In conclusion, the ends have not justified the means or the reasons for action. We could have ride Iraq of Saddam with more efficient methods. But if we are the Earth???s remover of bad, evil dictators, abusive theocracies, or brutal totalitarianism then we have a lot of countries to invade and trillions of dollars more for the middle class to finance.
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The Great Moqtada Makeover
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By the summer, the aggressive raids had forced moderate Sadrists to the negotiating table; the ceasefire then gave them more latitude to work with the Americans. Ducote, an Atlanta native who once studied for the seminary, pointed out to them that if attacks on civilians ceased, he could cut back on the raids. As a good-faith measure, he released a well-known Shiite extremist shortly after his arrest. "We thought about it a lot and decided, 'We're going to do it because we really want this to work'," says Ducote. The gamble paid off. "That really, really earned us a lot of credibility." Tip-offs from locals soared. Attacks against civilians and the Coalition in Jihad have dropped to roughly one tenth of what they were when the Black Lions arrived. In October, Sunni and Shiite leaders in the neighborhood signed a peace deal.
As Ducote patrols the blocks of dun-colored houses, he waves at kids and chats with the new "guards"—former Mahdi Army fighters or, in the Sunni part of the neighborhood, former insurgents, who are paid about $300 a month by the Americans. In November he attended a ceremony honoring the death of Moqtada's father, Mohammed Sadeq Sadr. His Nokia cell phone rings constantly with calls from Mahdi Army reps and well-connected tribal sheiks making various demands. He often answers with the words shlone saha—Iraqi slang for "How are you?"—and can carry on a basic conversation in Arabic. One 4 a.m. call last week was to complain about a homemade grenade dumped in a Shiite family's yard. Ducote went out later that day and fired two sets of Iraqi guards who should have protected the house.
Ducote's superior, Lt. Col. Pat Frank, has tried to apply the Jihad template to other areas of southwest Baghdad under his control. In December, he brought together community leaders from neighboring Amel to sign their own ceasefire. "It was sort of like dominos," says a U.S. official familiar with the deal, who was not authorized to speak on the record. Frank likens the Mahdi Army to the once omnipotent Baath Party: Shiites who want to have influence in their communities have to become members at least nominally. "Pretty much anybody who has any power at all has done something that Americans would think is illegal or wrong," says another of Frank's subordinates, Capt. Sean Lyons, who commands U.S. forces in Amel. Like Ducote, he's used judicious prisoner releases to build good will with local leaders. "It's a chess game," he says.
The hope is that this kind of bottomup reconciliation will push senior Sadrist leaders toward moderation, too. (A senior Sadr aide, Ahmed Shaybani, was arrested by the Americans and released by Petraeus last spring. Petraeus says he is now the head of the Mahdi Army.) But things could just as well turn out badly. If Sadr achieves the rank of ayatollah, he will be a heavyweight political, as well as religious, authority—and he'll have a leaner, more loyal militia at his disposal. Ambassador Ryan Crocker has drawn comparisons between Sadr's movement and Hizbullah, which does not bode well for long-term stability.
At the end of last week a senior Sadrist cleric said there were ongoing discussions with Moqtada about whether to extend the ceasefire. In Hurriya, meanwhile, another bad seed was picked off by Mahdi gunmen last Monday. He was suspected of running an extortion racket—threatening residents for rent money—in the neighborhood.
With Larry Kaplow and Ahmad Obaidi in Baghdad and Bureau Reports
© 2008
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